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RATE LITIG.TION-FACT DETERMINATION BY JUDI-
CLL GUESSWORK
THE Supreme Court of the United States has decided that
certain elements of value must be considered in fixing a base
for public utility rates.' Legal writers have usually devoted
much more attention to the relevancy of each particular element
of value, and to the synthetic process by which such elements
are combined to reach the ultimate fact of "fair value," than
to the technique of determining the facts upon which the ele-
ments of value must be predicated.2 And while it may be diffi-
cult to isolate completely this latter phase of the judicial process
in rate cases, a careful examination of the court records in a
number of these cases demonstrates that the courts in their
present organization are ill equipped to deal with this primary
fact-finding function.3
Such an examination indicates that one serious defect in the
present machinery is to be found in the incompetency of courts
I Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (1898); Minne ota Rate
Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729 (1913); Board of Public Utility Com-
missioners v. N. Y. Tel. Co., 271 U. S. 23, 46 Sup. Ct. 363 (192G) ; McCardle
v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (192G); St. Louis
& O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384 (1929);
United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50
Sup. Ct. 123 (1930).
2 Cf. Goddard, Fair Value of Public Utilities (1924) 22 Mici. L. REV.
652, 777; Bonbright, The Economic Merits of Original Cost and Reproduc-
tion Cost (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 593; Goddard, The Evolution of Cost of
Reproduction as the Rate Base (1928) 41 HARV. L. RE.V. 564; Guernsey,
Value in Confiscation Cases (1929) 77 U. PA. L. REv. 575; Wherry, The
O'Fallon Case (1929) 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 39; Cohen, Confiscatory Rates
and Modern Finance (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 151. See also WHITEN, VALUA-
TION OF PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1928); GRONINGEm, PUBLC
UTILITY RATE MAKING (1928).
3 The rate case, of course, is only one of the many types in which con-
stitutional questions involve questions of fact. See Willcox, Social Statistics
as an Aid to the Courts (1913) 47 Am. L. REV. 259; Frankfurter, Hours of
Labor and Redlism in Constitutional Law (1916) 29 HARv. L. Ray. 353;
Kales, New Methods in Due-Process Cases (1918) 12 AM. PoL. SCL REV.
241; Powell, The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation (1924) 37 Hnv.
L. REV. 545; Bikl6, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting
the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Actim (1924) 38 H~tnv. L. REV.
6; Barnett, External Evidence of the Constitutionality of Statutes (1924)
3 ORE. L. REV. 195; FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE Busixass OF TE
SuREAME COURT (1927) c. 8; Note (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 360.
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of general jurisdiction to deal with the highly technical factual
issues involved in rate cases. This is nowhere better illustrated
than when "present value" or "reproduction cost" is a subject
of controversy. In United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Commis-
sion,4 the principal dispute was over the value of the company's
natural gas leaseholds embracing 814,911 acres.5 Two experts
for the company valued the leaseholds at $36,449,176 and $32,-
000,000 respectively, 6 and the expert for the Commission
thought they were worth about $11,000,000. In order to de-
cide what weight, if any, should be given to these different valu-
ations, it was necessary for the court to examine the calculations
and data upon which they were based. The calculation of the
total volume of gas underlying the acreage involved the use
of Boyle's Law of gases and complicated mining, engineering,
and geological data.8 The computation of value involved the
application of the estimated price of gas during the next
eighteen years to the calculated volume of gas recoverable.0
Eighteen years was the estimated life of the field.10 The price
of gas during that period depended upon whether the use of
gas would continue in the steel industry, and this in turn in-
volved the future price of coal and the possibility that coal
would displace gas." There was expert testimony that coal
would not displace gas and that the price of gas would not
fall, ' 2 and there was expert testimony to the contrary 3  A
memorandum setting forth the conditions which obtained in
the coal industry was presented to the court.1 4  Probably no
court of general jurisdiction possesses sufficient technical back-
ground to unravel such a mass of data.15
4278 U. S. 300, 49 Sup. Ct. 150 (1929).
5 Record, p. 1006.
0 Uebelacker, Record, pp. 796, 803 et seq.; .Wyer, Record, p. 762 et seq.
7 Hagenah, Record, pp. 942, 943.
S See 278 U. S. at 314, 49 Sup. Ct. at 154; testimony of Davis, Record,
p. 822 et seq.
9 Ibid.
10 Record, pp. 885, 908, 966, 967; oral argument (Mr. John W. Davis),
Record, Vol. 3, pp. 17, 27.
"1 See 278 U. S. at 315, 317, 318, 49 Sup. Ct. at 154, 155; Record, pp. 914,
917.
2 Record, pp. 788, 795, 796, 976 et seq., 983 et seq.
Is Record, pp. 914, 917.
14Hagenah Exhibit No. 3, Record, p. 1534.
21 The lowest value assigned to the leaseholds by any witness for the com-
pany was $30,000,000. The Court, however, found that no value greater
than $6,732,920 had been established by the company.
The Court rejected most of the company's evidence as "speculative"
and unreliable. 278 U. S. at 318, 49 Sup. Ct. at 155. That this decision
was not easy to make is further indicated by the fact that similar evidence
had been considered and approved by at least two state courts. Erie City
v. Public Service Commission, 278 Pa. 512, 123 Atl. 471 (1924) ; Penn. Gas
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In fixing the value of artificial structures, the courts are
also confronted with problems which require trained judgment
-here of an expert construction engineer. Thus in Ottfngcr
v. Consolidated Gas Co.'6 the reproduction cost of a large tun-
nel was in dispute. Two experts respectively estimated the
cost at $8,750,676 and $5,903,884.'1 In McCardle v,. I-zdianapolis
Water Co.,' s there were discrepancies between the valuations
placed upon many parts of the utility's property by Elmes and
Hagenah, the company's two expert engineers. Among these
discrepancies were the following: Elmes Hagenah
881 feet, 16 inch wrought iron pipe 
(in
place) 19 ........................... $3,673 $7,570
52 feet, 42 inch cast iron pipe (in place) 20 $1,236 $1,940
Radial brick stack chimney 2 1 . . . . . . . . . .  $13,588 $21,597
Landscape gardening. ............... $13,673 $5,249
Mr. Elmes explained 23 that such discrepancies were usual,
being due to difference in the engineer's judgment as to con-
struction methods, and that there "can be an exercise of judg-
ment as between two methods which will amount to a 100 %
difference in cost, the judgment being whether you will or not
arrive at a result." 24 Mr. Elmes testified that his estimate of
total reproduction cost "happened" to agree very closely with
Mr. Hagenah's, and that the difference of only 5.6% between
them constituted a "vindication of both." -  The substantial
agreement of the totals was due to the fact that the various
discrepancies balanced one another.-0 Such totals, however,
may not "happen" to agree, particularly if the utility is so
Co. v. Public Service Commission, 211 App. Div. 253, 207 N. Y. Supp. 599
(3d Dep't 1925). The Supreme Court's refusal to guess further than that
the evidence was "speculative" and unreliable appears to be a recognition
of its own technical shortcomings. See Comment (1929) 38 YA,= L. J.
1116, 1117, 1123.
le 272 U. S. 576, 47 Sup. CL 198 (1926).
3.7 Master's Opinion, 6 F. (2d) 243, 256 (S. D. N. Y. 1925) (Sub nomina
Consolidated Gas Co. v. Prendergast), Record 68, at 96, 97.
38 Supra note 1.
29 Record, p. 101.
"0r Ibid
21 Record, p. 104.
22 biF.
23 Record, pp. 100-110.
24 Record, p. 106. Mr. Elmes also testified: "I would not be surprised
at all that, in comparing 75 items on a sheet taken at random from my
appraisal with a similar appraisal of Mr. Hagenah's, you would find a
difference in the appraisals which -might vary from 20% to 75%. I never
saw two appraisals which did not do that. I would believe my appraisal
to be correct." Record, p. 107.




small that there is slight opportunity for "balancing." The
court must then pass upon the technical feasibility of construc-
tion methods. A further perplexity arises when the various
estimates are based on different price levels. This was the situ-
ation in Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co.,27 where there were seven
estimates, no two of which were based on the same price level.18
Accurate comparison of such valuations is of course difficult.
And the difficulty is increased if, as sometimes happens, the
expert witnesses arrive at their figures by different methods. 0
The determination of a utility's book cost raises many in-
tricate questions of cost-accounting. The complexity of corporate
books is almost proverbial. In Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co.,30
two trained accountanis spent sixteen days in examining the
company's books.31 They admitted that a thorough examination
would have taken them from three to five months1'2 These ac-
countants computed that the total book cost of the company's
plant and property was $1,963,242 .3 The total as shown on
the company's balance sheet was $2,580,393.34 The difference
of $617,151 was due to the elimination of certain items by the
accountants. Another expert accountant and engineer spent
six weeks in studying this report and all the other evidence
and, after complicated computations and further deductions,
found that the total book cost was really only $1,365,557.,"
The court was thus confronted with a problem in cost account-
ing which might well perplex a specially trained accountant
and engineer.
The calculation of a public utility's operating expenses in-
volves still other problems. In Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commissin,30 an engineer
27271 U. S. 131, 46 Sup. Ct. 446 (1926).
2SMaster's Report, Record, p. 110 et. seq.; Record, pp. 347, 348, 351-354.
29 In McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., supra note 1, Hagenah allowed
$235,000 for working capital (Record, pp. 72, 84) ; Elmes allowed $361,245
(Record, pp. 94, 194). The results appear to have been reached by differ-
ent methods. Hagenah determined the depreciation of the property
(Record, p. 77); Elmes made no depreciation study, but computed the
"rehabilitation cost" (Record, pp. 94, 98). In Ottinger v. Consolidated
Gas Co., supra note 16, the witnesses who estimated the reproduction cost
of the tunnel used different methods. Master's Opinion, supra note 17, at
256, Record 68, at 97.
30 Supra note 27.
32. Record, p. 481 et seq.
32 Record, pp. 484, 485.
33 Plaintiff's Exhibit "P," Record, p. 325; Exhibit "A" to Plaintiff's Ex.
hibit "D," Record, p. 328.
34 Ibid.
3 Record, p. 586 et seq.; Defendant's Exhibit 13, p. 8, Record, p. 618.
30 262 U. S. 276, 43 Sup. Ct. 544 (1923).
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testifying as to the company's expenses presented an exhaustive
study of the telephone industry, dealing especially with the de-
velopments in the art and the increased cost of furnishing serv-
ice. This study, which was technical and detailed in the
extreme, occupied 133 pages in the printed record.T In Ottbzgcr
v. Cansolideted Gas Co.,38 the plaintiff company controlled, di-
rectly or indirectly through stock ownership, eight other large
corporations, each of which was engaged in furnishing gas to
consumers in the city of New York. The operation of these
companies was largely centralized, in order to effect economies,
and the mains of six of them, including those of the plaintiff,
were so interconnected that it was practically impossible to
determine what part of the gas furnished to consumers by any
one company was manufactured by that company. It was also
difficult to determine what portion of the total property was
used by the plaintiff individually., 9 Under these circumstances,
judges could hardly reach an accurate decision as to the plain-
tiff's individual operating expenses, unless they possessed the
professional qualifications of gas engineers and experienced
accountants.40
The technical character of the factual questions which arise
in rate cases has perhaps been sufficiently indicated. Certainly
it seems that enough evidence has been adduced to demonstrate
that unless a judge possessed the specialized knowledge of a
scientist, an engineer, and an accountant, he would hardly be
qualified to pass upon the complex technical questions of fact
which arose in the foregoing rate cases. Even if a judge were
eminently well qualified, however, the pressure of judicial busi-
ness would often prevent him from giving rate cases adequate
consideration. The record in any given case is seldom read by
all the members of the court,41 and in rate cases the enormous
length of the records makes it a physical impossibility for each
judge to read them. In seven rate cases recently decided by the
United States Supreme Court, the average length of the record
37 Record, pp. 354-487. The witness was Mr. F. L. Rhodes.
38 Supra note 16.
39 See Master's Opinion, supra note 17, at 246-252, Record 08, at 74-87.
40 The determination of a utility's earning capacity involves similar tech-
nical problems. In the McCardle. case, supra note 1, five or six trained ac-
countants spent about two months in estimating the revenue which the
company would receive in a given year. Record, p. 111. And in the Con-
solidated Gas case, supra note 16, this problem was of course very difficult.
In each of these cases the results of the accountants' labors were presented
,to the court and it was necessary for the court to determine their reliability
and accuracy.
41 In response to a questionnaire, judges have stated that this is so. See
(1925) 9 J. Aai. JuD. Soc. 50 et seq.
19301
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was 1502 pages.4 Combine lack of knowledge and training
with lack of time to read the evidence, and the result is fact
determination by judicial guesswork.43
Further examination of the records in utility rate cases dis-
closes that the slowness of the judicial process is a peculiarly
serious defect in the fact-finding machinery. The average time
reqiired for the determination of seven recent rate cases, from
the time the bill was fied to the decision by the Supreme Court,
42 Pages of Record Pages of Briefs
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Com-
mission, supra note 4 ............ 1602 209
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 278 U. S. 322, 49 Sup.
Ct. 157 (1929) .................. 1287 341
Ottinger v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,
272 U. S. 579,47 Sup. Ct. 199 (1926) 2251 303
Qttinger v. Kings County Lighting Co.,
272 U. S. 579, 47 Sup. Ct. 199 (1926) 944 143
Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
supra note 16 ................... 3075 602
Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co., supra
note 27 ......................... 990 609
MeCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.,
supra note 1 .................... 369 275
Average .................... 1502 354
We may hazard a guess that the enormous length of the records and
briefs accounts for the fact that opinions in rate cases are more often than
not written by the younger members of the Supreme Court of the United
States.
-1 The edse of United States v. Shipp, 214 U. S. 386, 29 Sup. Ct. 637
(1909), contains an interesting example of the result which may be reached
by a court sitting as a fact-finding body. That case was an original pro-
ceeding upon an information in contempt. The information charged that
while holding custody of a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, Shipp, a sheriff, had aided and abetted a mob which lynched the
prisoner. A commissioner was appointed and he proceeded to the locus
in quo, took all the testimony, and reported it to the Supreme Court without
comment. Briefs were filed and the case was orally argued. Having re-.
viewed parts of the evidence, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said: "Only one
conclusion can be drawn from these facts, all of which are clearly estab-
lished by the evidence-Shipp not only made the work of the mob easy, but
in effect aided and abetted it." 214 U. S. at 423 29 Sup. Ct. at 645. Four
Justices concurred with the Chief Justice. Mr. Justice Moody took no part.
Three Justices dissented, in. an opinion by Mr. Justice Peckham, who said:
"A careful consideration of the case leaves me with the conviction that
there is not one particle of evidence that any conspiracy had ever been
entered into or existed on the part of the sheriff, as charged against him.
It is not alone that the evidence preponderates in his favor, but it seems
to -me there is no material evidence against him, certainly none that rises
higher than the merest possible suspicion, founded upon evidence of factd
which are in themselves wholly inconclusive, and just as consistent with
innocence as with guilt." 214 U. S. at 426, 29 Sup. Ct. at 646. Someone
seems to have been mistaken.
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was approximately three years and seven months." By the
time the cases were decided, additions to or subtractions from
the utilities' property had probably rendered academic the par-
ticular questions involved. Thus, in the McCardle case,'5 the
court in November, 1926 found that the fair value of the com-
pany's property, as of January 1, 1924, was not less than $19,-
000,000. There had then been substantial evidence that in 1924,
1925, and 1926, the company would expend, for additions and
betterments, between two and three million dollars, and that
only half this expenditure would produce new revenue. Again,
in the United Fuel Gas Case;7 the estimated life of the com-
pany's gas field was eighteen years.48 It took five years to decide
the case-and during that time the field was being steadily ex-
hausted. Furthermore, a rate of return which is proper at one
time may not be so a year or two later under different eco-
nomic conditions.49  Hence a rate approved by the court, as
of the date when suit was instituted, may often be an improper
rate at the time the decision is rendered.
Another defect as revealed by the records is the great cost
of rate litigation. The Indianapolis Water Company spent over
$174,000 on rate litigation in 1923 and 1924. This included
only two proceedings before the Public Service Commission and
part of the proceedings in the Federal District Court. The
expense of the subsequent proceedings in the District Court,
and of the appeal, must have been large. During the five years
preceding 1925, rate cases cost the Consolidated Gas Company
$730,114. There was evidence that this expense would continue
for at least another year or two.", All these expenses, of
WUnited Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Bill Filled Decided Time
Commission ..................... Dee. 1923 Jan. 1929 5 years
United Fuel Gas. Co. v. Public Service
Commission ..................... April 1925 Jan. 1929 3 yrs. 8 mos.
Ottinger v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.. June 1923 Nov. 1926 3 yrs. 5 mos.
Ottinger v. Kings County Lighting Co. June 1923 Nov. 1926 3 yrs. 5 mos.
Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co..... June 1923 Nov. 1926 3 yrs. 5 rnos.
Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co ........ Aug. 1922 April 1926 3 yrs. 8 mos.
McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co.. Dec. 1923 Nov. 1926 2 yrs. 11 rnos.
Average .................. 3 yrs. '7 rnos.
45 Supra note 1.
46 Record, pp. 115, 116; Complainant's Exhibit 19, Record, p. 246.
47Supra note 4.48 Supra note 10.
49 Cf. Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U. S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264
(1922) ; United Railways & Electric Co. of Baltimore v. West, supra note
1, at 249, 50 Sup. Ct. at 125.
so AlcCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., supra note 1, Record, pp. 118, 140.
SI Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra note 16, Master's Opinion,
supra note 17, at 267, 268, Record, 68 at 124. See Goddard, Fair Traltic of
Public Utilities, supra note 2, at 178, 779.
1930]
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course, must be borne by the consumers.5 2
Delay increases the expense of rate litigation. An interlocu-
tory injunction restraining the enforcement of a rate-fixing or-
der or statute is commonly accompanied by a provision that if
the injunction is later dissolved, the complainant shall refund
the excess charges to its consumers. Thus the complainant must
bear the expense of keeping special accounts and of giving a
bond to secure repayment.53  At times, the court orders the
"excess" charges to be impounded to abide the event of the
suit,5 4 and may require that the consumers be given receipts
for such charges, with the understanding that if the company
is unsuccessful in the litigation the receipts will be cashed.",
Such orders are usually continued in force pending an appeal
from an injunction, either interlocutory or permanent.", Mani-
festly, the longer the litigation is prolonged, the greater the ex-
pense of keeping the separate account and furnishing bond; and
if the excess charges have been impounded, the money so ac-
cumulated may be lost, by the failure of the bank of deposit
or other~vise. In any event, the company is deprived of the
use of the money, and compelled to accept a low rate of interest
thereon.5 7 As for the consumers, if receipts have been given
it is likely that most of them will have been lost or destroyed
before the final decision is rendered.
Obviously, the situation which has been described would be
alleviated by the appointment of additional judges, which would
relieve the pressure of judicial business and allow courts time
to become familiar with the evidence and the technical and
-2These expenses may be included and allowed in the operating expenses
of the year in which they were incurred. Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Lehigh Nay. El. Co., P. U. R. 1924E, 737; cf. Re Consolidated Gas,
Electric Light, & Power Co. of Baltimore, P. U. R. 1924D, 177. Or they
may be pro-rated over a short period. Consolidated Gas Co. v, Newton, 267
Fed. 231 (S. D. N. Y. 1920), a~ff'd, 258 U. S. 165, 42 Sup. Ct. 264 (1922);
New York & Richmond Gas Co. v. Prendergast, 10 F. (2d) 167, P. U. R.
1925E, 19 (E. D. N. Y. 1925).
53 Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U. S. 43, 43 Sup. Ct. 460 (1923);
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Francisco, 211 Fed. 202 (N. D.
Cal. 1913). See 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 28 U.S.C.A. § 382 (1928).
54 As in Hunter v. Wood, 209 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 472 (1908). of.
Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra note 49.
F5 See Hunter v. Wood, supr note 54, at 207, 28 Sup. Ct. at 473.
56 Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission, supra note 36, Record, pp. 111, 112; Lincoln Gas Co. v. Lincoln,
223 U. S. 349, 32 Sup. Ct. 271 (1912); Ottinger v. Consolidated Gas Co.,
supra note 16, Record, p. 325 (Final decree, §§ X, XI, XII); United Fuel
Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, suyra note 4, Record, pp. 1595, 1596, 1597;
See Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., supra note 49, at 177, 42 Sup. Ct. at
267; Federal Equity Rule 74, 198 Fed. xxxix (1912).




scientific principles involved. The appointment of judges con-
versant with public utility matters would be expedient.
Again, the labors of appellate courts would be lightened if
complete and careful findings of fact were made and reported
by the courts below. The procedure whereby this might be
accomplished was indicated in Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul
Ry. v. Tompkins,'8 where the Supreme Court held the findings
of the lower court insufficient and remanded the case with in-
structions that it be referred to "some competent master to
report fully the facts." Mr. Justice Brewer said:
"Ought we to examine the testimony, find the facts, and from
those facts, deduce the proper conclusions? ... We think this
is one of those cases in which it is especially important that
there should be a full and clear finding of the facts by the trial
court. The questions are difficult, the interests are vast, and
therefore the aid of the trial court should be had..... we think
we are entitled to have the benefit of the services of a compe-
tent master and an approval of his findings by the trial court." 52
In the Consolid:ted Gas case 1o such a special master was ap-
pointed. He took the testimony and prepared an exhaustive
report,61 which contained "a valuable analysis of the relevant
evidence and clear statements concerning values," and set out
distinctly the "evidence ... as to cost of production, expenses
of the business, etc." - This report proved very helpful to the
court. In the McCardle case, 3 on the other hand, the finding
by the lower court was inadequate 0 There was no analysis or
summary of the evidence.
The courts must depend upon counsel for helpful presenta-
tion of evidence both at the trial and on appeal. The Supreme
Court, however, has complained that counsel are not sufficiently
helpful. In Newtan v. Consolidated Gas Co.," the Court said,
through Mr. Justice McReynolds:
5&176 U. S. 167, 20 Sup. Ct. 336 (1900).
59 Ibid. 179, 20 Sup. Ct. at 340. Mr. Justice Brewer added: "The writer of
this opinion appreciates the difficulties which attend a trial court in a case
like this. In Smyth v. Ames [supra note 1], he, as Circuit Judge . . .
undertook the work of examining the testimony, making computations, and
finding the facts. It was very laborious, and took several weeks. It was a
work which really ought to have been done by a master. . . . We are all
of opinion that a better practice is to refer the testimony to some competent
master, to make all needed computations and find fully the facts." 176
U. S. at 179, 20 Sup. Ct. at 341.
60Supra note 16.
61Supra note 17.
152 Per Mr. Justice McReynolds, supra note 16, at 578, Sup. CL at 199.
63 Supra, note 1.
64 Record, p. 56.
6 5Supra note 49.
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"Equity Rules 75 and 76 direct that records on appeal shall
not set forth the evidence fully but in simple condensed form
and require omission of non-essentials and mere formal parts
of documents. Without apparent attempt to comply with these
rules and with assent of appellee's counsel, appellants have filed
a record of 21 volumes-twenty thousand printed pages-made
up largely of stenographic reports of proceedings before the
Master with hundreds of useless exhibits and many thousand
pages of matter without present value. This is indefensible
practice . . ." ",
In the subsequent case of Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co.,01 Mr.
Justice McReynolds again protested:
"The record in this cause has been made up with such dis-
regard of the rules that we cannot undertake to examine the
evidence or to discuss seriatim the thirty-four jumbled assign-
ments of error. It would be permissible to dismiss the appeal
. . . but, considering the public interest and with purpose to
prevent any serious miscarriage of justice, we have examined
the pleadings, the master's report, the opinions and the
decrees." e8
The foregoing examination of the records indicates the op-
portunity of a partial solution. The appellate courts might
insist upon better workmanship in the trial courts or the ap-
pointment of technically qualified masters to ascertain the facts.
Furthermore, counsel might be compelled to improve their pres-
entation by judicious exercise of the trial court's discretion and
strict enforcement of the rules of court upon appeal.
Legal writers have also suggested that the adoption of a new
theory of value would eliminate many of the difficulties which
arise at present.6 Yet even if agreement could be had upon
a new and glittering theory, before the courts could finally fix
a rate they would still be confronted with the necessity of deter-
mining a utility's revenues, operating expenses and other essen-
0 Ibid. 173, 42 Sup. Ct. at 266.
6 7 Supra note 27.
68Ibid. at 132, 46 Sup. Ct. at 445. The rules of the Supreme Court
provide that the appellant's brief shall contain "a concise statement of the
case containing all that is material to the consideration of the questions
presented," which shall be followed by the argument. Revised Rules, 1928,
Rule 27, 275 U. S. 614. In the Patterson case, supr. note 27, appellant's
statement of the case and summary of the evidence was unnecessarily long
and detailed, and often confusing. See appellant's brief, pp. 1-167. The
recent Interborough Rapid Transit rat case, 279 U. S. 159, 49 Sup. Ct.
282 (1929), was so poorly presented to the Supreme Court, on the first
argument, that the Court ordered the case to be reargued, and more com-
pact and helpful briefs to be filed. N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1928, at p. 1.
69 See, e.g., Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Missouri ex rel. South-
western Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, supra note 36,
at 289, 43 Sup. Ct. at 547; Goddard, Fair Value of Public Utilities, supra
note 2, at 782 et seq.
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tial facts. Since complex questions of fact cannot, therefore,
be avoided, the question arises whether the present methodology
is not so inadequate as to demand fundamental reform. 0
70 The creation of special appellate courts for handling rate litigation is
one possibility.
In recent years much new legal machinery has been evolved to handle
various types of complex and technical litigation. The rate-fixing boards
and commissions may be mentioned as examples as vwell as the Federal
IRadio Commission, 44 STAT. 1162 (1927), 47 U. S. C. A. § 81
et seq. (1928), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 45 STAT. 1475
(1929), 28 U. S. C. A. § 301a et seq. (1929), and the Federal Board of Tax
Appeals, 44 STAT. 105 (1924), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1211 et scq. (1928). The
tendency has been towards specialized tribunals, with appeals from these
bodies to courts of general jurisdiction. In the process of evolution, special
appellate courts for handling rate litigation may be devised. The precise
character such tribunals might take, and the question of whether their
creation would be in all respects expedient and practicable, are subjects too
extensive for this paper.
The findings of state commissions are sometimes treated as prima facie
conclusive by the state courts. See Northern Indiana Telephone & Cable
Co. v. Peoples Mutual Telephone Co., 187 Ind. 486, 491, 119 N. E. 212, 213
(1918); ILL. REv. STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1929) c. 1112/3, § 72. And the
Supreme Court of the United States accords similar weight to the findings
-of the Interstate Commerce Commission. See Virginian Ry. v. United
States, 272 U. S. 658, 47 Sup. Ct. 222 (1926); Western Chemical Co. v.
United States, 271 U. S. 268, 46 Sup. Ct. 500, (1914); 43 STAT. 939 (1925),
15 U. S. C. A. § 21 (1928); (1926) 38 STAT. 734 (1914). Cf. New York &
Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245 U. S. 345, 38 Sup. Ct. 122 (1917). But in
-other cases the Supreme Court reserves the right to exercise its independent
judgment, unfettered by any artificial rules as to the weight of the findings
below. Cf. City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U. S. 1, 29 Sup.
Ct. 148 (1909); Denver v. Denver Union Water Co., 246 U. S. 1'8, 38 Sup.
Ct. 278 (1918); Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 262 U. S. 679, 43 Sup. Ct. 675 (1923). But see Van Dyke v.
Geary, 244 U. S. 39, 49, 37 Sup. Ct. 483, 487 (1917) ; Galveston Electric Co.
v. Galveston, 258 U. S. 388, 401, 402, 42 Sup. Ct. 351, 356, 357 (1922).
The state must provide a fair opportunity for submitting the issue of
confiscation "to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own inde-
pendent judgment as to both law and facts." Ohio Valley Water Co. v.
Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 Sup. Ct. 527 (1920). Hence even
though they may treat the findings below as prima facie conclusive, the
courts must still decide questions of fact in rate cases.
But see Beutel, Valuation as a Requiremzenl in Rate Cases, (1930) 43
HARV. L. Ray. 1249.
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FEDERAL PROTECTION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT OF 1926
"LEGISLATION forbidding employers from interfering with the
membership of their employees in labor unions is invalid. All
courts have reached this conclusion." 1 Thus Dean Pound, writ-
ing in 1909, summed up the cases. Laws making it criminal
for an employer to discharge an employee because of member-
ship in a labor union had been declared unconstitutional by
many courts.2 The same fate had overtaken legislation forbid-'
ding the "yellow dog" contract, in which the employee agrees
not to join a labor union.3  In Adair v. United States4 the
Supreme Court of the United States adopted the first position,
and in Coppage v. Kansas 5 the second, upholding in both cases
the constitutional rights of an employer to hire and fire at will.
Advocates of collective bargaining accused the courts of dis-
criminating between capital and labor, arguing that the efforts
of the employer to preserve the non-union shop were thus pro-
tected while the right of labor to strike for the closed shop
was often limited.6 For many years these arguments seemed
to make little impression on the judiciary. The right of labor
to organize was gradually accorded more cordial recognition 7
but the right of the employer to discharge remained absolute.8
Not until the recent case of Texas & N. 0. R. R. v. Brotherhood
of Railway & Steamship Clerks 0 did anything occur to suggest
IPound, Liberty of Contract (1909) 18 YALE L. J. 454, 481.
2 State v. Julow, 129 Mo. 163, 31 S. W. 781 (1895); Gillespie v. People,
188 Ill. 176, 58 N. E. 1007 (1900); Ohio v. Bateman, 7 Ohio N. P. 487
(1900); State v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wis. 530, 90 N. W. 1098 (1902); Coffey-
ville Vitrified Brick & Tile Co. v. Perry, 69 Kan. 297, 76 Pac. 848 (1904).
3 People v. Marcus, 185 N. Y. 257, 77 N. E. 1073 (1906).
4208 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 277 (1908).
5236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240 (1914).
6 ComImONs AND ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION (1927) 123
and cases cited at 114.
7 Perhaps the most sympathetic words concerning collective bargaining
to be found in a majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court,
prior to the principal case, are those of Chief Justice Taft: "Union was
essential to give laborers an opportunity to deal on equality with their
employers. They united to exert influence upon him and to leave him in a
body in order by this inconvenience to induce him to make better terms
with them. They were withholding their labor of economic value to make
him pay what they thought it was worth. The right to combine for such a
lawful purpose has in many years not been denied by any court." American
Steel Foundries Co. v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184, 209,
42 Sup. Ct. 72, 78 (1921).
8 State v. Daniels, 118 Minn. 155, 136 N. W. 584 (1912).
0 50 Sup. Ct. 427 (1930). Decisions of the lower courts in the same case
are reported as follows: 24 F. (2d) 426 (S. D. Tex. 1928) (contempt pro-
ceedings); 25 F. (2d) 873 (S. D. Tex. 1928) (permanent injunction);
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that Dean Pound's generalization was no longer an accurate
statement of the law.
This case involved the interpretation and application of a
section of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, providing that rep-
resentatives for the settlement of labor disputes should be chosen
"'without interference, influence, or coercion exercised by either
-party over the self-organization or designation of representa-
tives by the other." "I The brotherhood, already recognized by
the railroad as the representative of its employees, applied for
a wage increase, which was denied. These demands were then
referred, by the brotherhood alone, to the United States Board
of Mediation, charged by the Act of 1926 with the duty of
attempting to induce the settlement or voluntary arbitration of
labor disputes. The railroad, anticipating that resort to arbi-
tration would result in substantial additions to its payroll, re-
fused all offers of mediation and arbitration, withdrew its
recognition of the brotherhood, and proceeded to establish a
company union.- The brotherhood thereupon obtained an in-
junction ordering the railroad to abstain from interfering with
its employee's representation and self-organization. Despite
the injunction, the railroad officially recognized the company
union and discharged several employees because of their activi-
ties in behalf of the brotherhood. In contempt proceeding these
men were ordered reinstated and the company union disestab-
lished. Counsel for the railroad, in an appeal to the Supreme
Court of the United States, argued that these orders were based
upon an unwarranted and uncofistitutional interpretation of the
statute, but the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the deci-
sions of the lower courts. ='
To the contention of the appellants that the injunction and
contempt orders constituted an extension of federal authority
beyond the limits established in Advir v. Uititcd States and
Coppage v. Knsas, Chief Justice Hughes answered shortly,
25 F. (2d) 876 (S. D. Tex. 1928) (motion to vacate contempt order); and
33 F. (2d) 13 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929) (appeal).
In its passage through the lower courts the case drew comment, upon
aspects not treated in this note, from the following journals: Note (1928)
13 CoRN. L. Q. 447, 451 (company unions); (1929) 29 CoL. L. 11Ev. 1020
(development of federal arbitration); (1930) 28 Mici. L. lRsv. G21 (in-
junctions). The decisions have been acclaimed as a great victory for labor
in the following labor periodicals: (1927) THE TRAIN DISPATCHER 495;
(1929) 18 LAnoR AGE 19; (1927) 24 THE RAmwAY CLERK 351.
1 o44 STAT. 577 (1926), 45 U. S. C. § 152 (1928).
1 All of these facts do not clearly appear in the opinion of the Supreme
Court, but are substantiated by letters and telegrams reproduced in 25 F.
(2d) 874, n. 1, 24 F. (2d) 432, n. 13, and the transcript of the record
(Supreme Court of the United States, October term, 1929, No. 469, p. 112).
'AIr. Justice McReynolds did not hear the argument and took no part
in the decision of the case.
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"These'decisions are inapplicable." 13 Although the opinion thus
briefly indicates that the Adair case and the principal case may
be distinguished, the two seem worthy of comparison. The
statutes involved were both passed as part of voluntary rail-
road arbitration systems; both recognized and sought to protect
labor organizations as necessary instruments in arbitration.14
But the Act of 1898 15 was a criminal statute protecting only
union men from discrimination, whereas the Act of 1926 is a
civil statute affording equal protection to all forms of employer
and employee organization. On paper the two statutes seem
very different; in operative effect they are, as the result of the
principal case indicates, essentially similar. In ordering the
railroad to purge itself of contempt by reinstating men dis-
charged for their connection with the brotherhood, the Supreme
Court does today by judicial decree what it refused, in 1908, to
allow Congress to do by legislation.1,
Counsel for the railroad seem to have attacked this apparent
inconsistency as another instance of the tyranny of government
by injunction; 17 but support is not lacking for the contention
that it is the natural culmination of recent developments in
labor law. Between the Adair case and the principal case there
is a history of slowly growing concepts which in this sharp con-
trast now bear their inevitable fruit.
The court in the Adair case concluded that the power to reg-
ulate interstate commerce did not extend to labor organizations
13 The argument of the railroad is elaborated at p. 114 ct seq. of the
appellant's brief and answered in the principal case, 50 Sup. Ct. at 434.
14 Justice McKenna in his dissenting opinion in the Adair case explains
the relations between the provision then in question and the arbitration
system established by the Erdman Act of 1898. Adair v. 7. S., 208 U. S.
at 180 et seq., 28 Sup. Ct. at 283 et seq. District Judge Hutcheson performs
a similar service for the Act of 1926. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship
Clerks v. Texas & N. 0. R. R., 24 F. (2d) at 431.
15 30 Stat. 424 (1898).
16 Counsel for the brotherhood contended that the contempt decree should
be considered on a different basis from the injunction because, "courts of
equity are almost unlimited in their power in contempt proceedings to
enter remedial orders restoring the status quo ante." Respondent's Brief
133. But the injunction was itself very indefinite, merely repeating the
words of the statute, whereas the contempt decree showed the court's
interpretation of the words "interference, influence and coercion." Further-
more, Judge Hutcheson himself said that the court in ordering the dis-
charged men reinstated, inferentially ordered that their discharge "should
not again occur for the same or similar reasons." 25 F. (2d) at 877.
Thus it seems that the contempt order was the real application of the
statute to the facts of the case.
17 The application of the injunction to the interests of capital here elicits
a protest very similar to that often voiced by advocates of labor. That this




of employees engaged in interstate commerce. Justice Harlan,
speaking for the majority, could conceive of no "legal or logical
connection ...between an employee's membership in a labor
organization and the carrying on of interstate commerce." "3
The dissenting justices, however, found such a connection in
the possible effects of activities of organized labor upon the con-
tinuity of commerce and a system of arbitration intended to
prevent its interruption. 9 The practical nature of that connec-
tion was emphasized by subsequent st.ikes and threats of
strikes, which inspired new federal laws regulating commerce.:"
Its legal existence has been since foreshadowed by the gradual
extension of federal regulation to other aspects of the labor
problem.
In The Employers' Liability Casesi' decided at the same term
as the Adair case, the court wrestled with the question of whether
the power to regulate interstate commerce extended to relations'
of master and servant. A majority of six answered affirma-
tively, a minority of three negatively. But the line of division
was indistinct and in both camps there seemed to be differences
in degree. It remained for later cases and more specific issues
to clarify the attitude of the court. Three years after the
Adair decision an act of Congress governing the hours of labor
of railway employees was sustained as a proper regulation of
commerce because of the effect of hours of labor upon efficient
service and safe transportation. -2 2  In the Seconzd Employers'
Is 208 U. S. at 174, 28 Sup. Ct. at 282.
19 This connection is graphically described in Justice McKenna's dissent-
ing opinion where he says, "A provision of law which will prevent or tend
to prevent the stoppage of every wheel in every car of an entire railroad
system has as direct an influence upon interstate commerce as the Yay in
which one car may be coupled to another or the rule of liability for personal
injuries to an employee." 208 U. S. at 189, 28 Sup. Ct. at 286. Justice
Holmes seemed to find an even broader connection for he said, "These
unions exercise a direct influence upon the employment of labor in that
business, upon the terms of such employment, and upon the business itself."
208 U. S. at 190, 28 Sup. Ct. at 287.
20 The Erdman Act of 1898 was itself preceded by a great strike, and the
Newlands Act of 1913, 38 STAT. 103, U. S. C. §§ 101, 125 (1926), and the
Adamson Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 721, 45 U. S. C. §§ 65, 66 (1926), were
passed to prevent threatened strikes. Regarding the labor provisions of
the Transportation Act of 1920, Willoughby says, "The experiences of the
past few years and especially those attending the enactment of the Adamson
Act made it evident that if possible some means more, effective than those
that had been previously employed should be provided for obtaining an
equitable adjustment of the demands of railway employees without inter-
ruption to the running of 'the railroads." 2 WILLOUGHBY, CONSTITUTIOAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) 789.
21207 U. S. 463, 28 Sup. Ct. 141 (1908).
22 fBaltimore & Ohio R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 221 U. S.
612, 31 Sup. Ct. 621 (1910).
19301
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Liability Cases 23 the court unanimously upheld, the power of
Congress to change the common law rules of the liability of
railroads to their employees. In 1917, in the famous case of
Wilson v. New,24 the court found even wage fixing justified
when necessary to prevent the interruption of commerce.
Though the court, in this case, was hopelessly divided over
questions of "due process" and the legal connotations of a na-
tional emergency, the decision seems to establish that, when
public policy requires it, the power to regulate commerce ex-
tends to wages-the heart of the labor contract and the primary
object of collective bargaining.25 Thus federal authority has
gradually enveloped the relations of master and servant in
interstate commerce.
Parallel to this development, was the extension by means of
the anti-trust laws of federal regulation of commerce over the
weapons of organized labor. Here again we may begin with
a cdse decided at the same term as the Adair case, Loewe v.
Lawlor '26 in which a labor boycott was for the first time held
illegal as a restraint of interstate commerce. Following the
passage of the Clayton Act,2 7 sympathetic strikes, secondary
boycotts, unfair lists and the like, were still considered as "ob-
structions of commerce." 28 Thus local strikes in local indus-
tries became subject to federal prohibition when aimed at
non-union shops in other states. In 1924 the destruction by
strikers of mines, not in themselves part of interstate com-
merce, was held actionable under the anti-trust laws because
there was evidence that the outbreak was partly incited by
fear of the competition of non-union coal in national markets.,
Thus in motives as well as effects, connections have been dis-
covered between the battles of organized labor and the affairs
of interstate commerce. In most of the great labor cases of
the twentieth century may be found the germs of a "legal or
logical connection . . .between an employee's membership in
a labor organization and the carrying on of interstate com-
merce." In the light of this history, it is not surprising that
Chief Justice Hughes should have found the Adair decision "in-
23 223 U. S. 1, 32 Sup. Ct. 169 (1911).
24 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298 (1917).
25 Four justices dissented, but one of these, Justice Day, agreed that the
law was within the power to regulate interstate commerce. His objection
was to the lack of due deliberation, i.e. due process, in its enactment.
26 208 U. S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301 (1908).
2738 STAT. 730 (1914), 29 U. S. C. § 52 (1926).
2S Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522, 35 Sup. Ct. 170 (1915) ; Duplex Print-
ing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921); Bedford
Cut Stone Co. v. Journeyman Stone Cutters Ass'n, 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct.
522 (1927).
29 Coronado Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 268 U. S. 295,
45 Sup. Ct. 551 (1925).
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applicable." Having itself extended federal regulation to so
many activities of organized labor in intrastate as well as inter-
state industries, the Supreme Court could hardly have again
denied the power of Congress to regulate or protect the labor or-
ganizations of railway employees.
To affirm this power does not, however, answer the conten-
tion, upheld in the Adair case and unsuccessfully advanced in
the principal case, that to prevent an employer from discharg-
ing an employee because of his connection with a union is a
denial of "liberty of contract" and an infringement of the "due
process" clause of the constitution.30 Nor can a satisfactory
answer be found in the statute itself or the particular facts of
the case, for the Act of 1926, like the Act of 1898, provides for
voluntary arbitration, to which the railroad in the principal
case had refused to submit. A more plausible argument might
be based upon the history of twentieth century railroad legis-
lation and litigation wherein the rights of private property have
been conspicuously subordinated to considerations of public wel-
fare. In cases involving the regulation of rates and the redis-
tribution of income, as well as in the labor cases already
mentioned, the Court has accorded scant sympathy to the "due
process" defense. 31 But though this history may lend some
weight of analogy to the instant decision, it does not minimize
the surprising significance of the Court's changed attitude to-
ward t-o fundamental factors in collective bargaining. The
right of the employer to discharge has been hitherto considered
absolute; the right of the employee to organize has been rec-
ognized but denied protection. Now comes Chief Justice Hughes
and says, so briefly as if to conceal the significance of his
words, that the right to discharge may be limited in order that
right to organize may be protected: Thus the court, in giving
30 The orthodox approach to a problem of this sort has been to apply two
separate and distinct tests: (1) Is the law in question within the power
of Congress to regulate interstate commerce? (2) If so, is it a proper
exercise of that power, i.e. is it consonant with the "due proceses" clause
of the 5th amendment, or is it an unconstitutional infringement of the
rights of private property? Cf. United States v. Cress, 243 U. S. 316,
37 Sup. Ct. 380 (1917); Wilson v. New, supra note 24. However, when
a law regulates matters somewhat indirectly connected with commerce,
there is a tendency for the two questions to merge. The court, in showing
the effects on interstate commerce, is likely to show at the same time the
effects on the public welfare which may justify an infringement of private
rights, and thus answer both questions at once. Cf. principal case, 50 Sup.
Ct. at 433; Tagg Bros. & Morehead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 50
Sup. Ct. 220 (1929).
31 New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. i84, 435 Sup. C. 270 (1923);
Dayton Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct. 169
(1924).
= The exact words of the opinion seem worthy of note: "It has long been
recognized that employees are entitled to organize for the purpose of scour-
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full force to the Act of 1926, recognizes collective bargaining,
not merely as the subject of legal toleration, but also as the
proper recipient of legislative protection.
It is natural that this recognition, for which labor has so
long fought, should come first in the field of railroad regula-
tion where such persuasive phrases as "liberty of contract" and
"due process of law" have repeatedly yielded to exigencies of
public welfare. But the law made here may well affect the
law in other fields. The power to regulate interstate commerce
may now, without violence to precedent, be extended to include
labor relations in other industries. And what Congress can do
through the commerce power, the states may sometimes accom-
plish through the medium of the police power. 3 Thus collective
bargaining may yet find protection in state as well as federal
legislation.34
That these implications would be unanimously accepted by
the court which rendered the instant decision may well be
doubted; that they will be vigorously urged by labor's advocates
seems highly probable. At any rate, to Dean Pound's general-
ization, which endured intact for more than a score of years,
there has at last been added a suggestive peradventure.
ing redress of grievances and to promote agreements with employers re-
lating to rates of pay and conditions of work. . . . Congress was not
required to ignore this right but could safeguard it and seek to make their
appropriate collective action an instrument of peace rather than of strife.
Such collective action would be a mockery if representation were made
futile by interference with freedom of choice. Thus the prohibition by
Congress of interference with selection of representatives for the purpose
of negotiation and conference between employer and employees, instead of
being an invasion of the constitutional rights of either, was based on
recognition of the rights of both." 50 Sup. Ct. at 434.
33 3 WILLOUGHBY, op. cit. supra note 20, at c. XCV and cases cited therein.
34 In recent years labor has carried on an intensive campaign to secure
state legislation declaring the "yellow dog" contract illegal and void as
against public policy. Cochrane, "Yellow Dog" Abolished in Wisoonsin
(1929). 19 Am. LAB. LEG. Rav. 315. In Coppage v. Kansas the court argued
that the decision in the Adair case was direct precedent for declaring legis-
lation forbidding the "yellow dog" contract unconstitutional. 236 U. S. at 11,
35 Sup. Ct. at 242. Upon this authority, it may perhaps be argued that
the decision in the principal case is some precedent for declaring legislation
outlawing the "yellow dog" contract constitutional. But cf. Opinion of
Justices, 171 N. E. 234 (Mass. 1930).
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"DOUBLE" ILNHERITANCE TAXATION OF INTANGIBLES
DECISIONS of the last quarter-century portray a notable change
in the judicial attitude with respect to the power to levy an
inheritance tax upon intangibles 1 owned by non-resident de-
cedents. Blackstone v. Mille -,2 decided in 1903, upheld New
York in taxing the succession of a local bank account of a non-
resident decedent even though the account was similarly taxed
at the decedent's domicile. Early in the present year this deci-
sion was expressly overruled by the United States Supreme
Court in Farmers' Loau & Trust Co. v. Minnesoto.. This case
decided that registered and bearer state and municipal bonds,
issued in Minnesota, deposited in and subject to an inheritance
tax in New York, the decedent's domicile, could not be taxed
on the same succession by Minnesota. Several months later
the scope of this decision was broadened by Baldwin v. Mis-
souri.4 Here Illinois taxed the transfer of a resident decedents
intangibles consisting of bank deposits, Liberty bonds, and
promissory notes secured by mortgages on Missouri land. The
Supreme Court denied to Missouri the power to tax the suc-
cession of the same intangibles a second time, even though the
intangibles were physically present in Missouri and dependent
for delivery on the laws of that state.
Both decisions were based upon the objection of the Supreme
Court to so-called "double" taxation.5 It should be noted at
the outset, however, that "double" taxation is neither good nor
1 The use of "tangible" and "intangible" as connoting distinctive property
concepts has been criticized. Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 357. While
recognizing the validity of such criticism, the terms are adopted here for
reasons of general convenience. The New York reciprocal inheritance
statute defines intangibles as follows: "For the purposes of this section
intangible personal property means incorporeal property, including money,
deposits in banks, mortgages, debts, receivables, shares of stock, bonds,
notes, credits, evidences of an interest in property, and evidences of debt.
59 N. Y. CONS. LAws (McKinney, 1928) § 248p.
2 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277 (1903). Mr. Justice Holmes wrote the
opinion. Mr. Justice White dissented without opinion.
3 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930). For comment on this case see
Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 792; (1930) 30 COL. L. RE"V. 404; Note (1930)
5 Wis. L. Rsv. 441; Note (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 457; Note (1930) 7 N. Y.
U. L. Q. REv. 728.
4 50 Sup. Ct. 436 (U. S. 1930).
5In the Minnesota case, 280 U. S. at 211, 50 Sup. Ct. at 100, Mr. Justice
McReynolds says in part: "Primitive conditions have passed; business is
now transacted on a national scale. A very large part of the country's
wealth is invested in negotiable securities whose protection against discrimi-
nation, unjust and oppressive taxation, is matter of greatest moment...
Existing conditions no less imperatively demand protection of choses in
action against multiplied taxation whether following misapplication of some
legal fiction or conflicting theories concerning the sovereign's right to
exact contributions."
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bad in itself.0 Wealth which has been subjected to a property
tax may also form part of an estate upon which an inheritance
tax is levied. And an individual accumulation of wealth may
be taxed on succession by both state and Federal governments.
In either of the foregoing cases, all estates, irrespective of the
form which property comprising them may take, are subject
to the same type of double assessment. Before any double as-
sessment may properly be criticized as such, however, it must
result in some arbitrary discrimination against a particular
form of property. Arbitrary discrimination of this nature gen-
erally arises when the multiple character of a particular set of
taxes results largely from adventitious causes.
Previous to the instant decisions, the purely adventitious
character of multiple inheritance taxation resulting from a
classification of property into "tangibles" and "intangibles,"
whereby under precisely the same circumstances7 estates com-
posed of "tangibles" were taxed but once while those composed
of "intangibles" were taxed twice or more, was generally rec-
ognized, at least extra-judicially, as leading to arbitrary" dis-
6 Cf. Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks, 253 U. S. 325, 40 Sup. Ct. 558
(1920).
"Previous to the Minnesota case intangibles were taxed on succession at
the domicile of the decedent and frequently again at the debtor's domicile,
ef. Blackstone v. Miller, supra note 2, at the physical situs of the securities,
Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U. S. 434, 34 Sup. Ct. 607 (1914), and at the
business situs of the credits, Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133,
20 Sup. Ct. 585 (1900), whereas real property was taxed only by the state
of its situs and tangible personal property at either the owner's domicile
or at an acquired situs but never at both. Cf. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268
U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603 (1925) (holding an inheritance tax void insofar
as it was levied on a resident decedent's tangible personal property with an
actual extra-state situs). See in general Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts
(1918) 31 HAav. L. Rsv. 906, 918; Chambers, Stdto Inheritance Tax on
Foreign Held Bondi or Notes Secured by a 'Mortgage on Land in the State
(1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 172; Beale, Jurisdiction to Tax (1919) 32 HAnV. L.
REv. 587; Powell, Extra-Territorial Inheritance Taxation (1920) 20 COL. L.
Rnv. 283; Lorenzen, Extraterritorial Succession Taxes (1927) 1 CONN.
BAR J. 154.
8 The language of the Supreme Court in both the Minnesota and Missouri
decisions tends to support the contention that "double"* taxation becomes
objectionable when it presents elements of arbitrary discrimination arising
from purely adventitious circumstances. The decision of the same court in
Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83, 53 Sup. Ct. 59 (1929),
further justifies this conclusion. In that case, Virginia, domicile of the
cestuis of a trust, was denied the right to assess a property tax against the
trust estate composed of "intangibles" in the possession of a Maryland
trustee and (apparently) subject to a property tax in Maryland. Implicit
in the decision appears a recognition that the allowance of Virginia's claim
would have resulted in discrimination against the cestuis purely by virtue
of the accidental circumstance of the estate being administered in a jurisdic-
tion other than that of their residence. For comment on this case see (1930)
39 YALE L. J. 589; Note (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 539. Cf. Commonwealth v.
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criminationY Such taxation was declared inequitable,' uneco-
nomic," impractical and inconvenient,- and of doubtful financial
Pennsylvania R. R., 279 Pa. 308, 147 Atl. 242 (1929), in which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court indicated that "double" taxation becomes
objectionable when "unintended" by the legislature.
Any conclusion as to the. arbitrary character of a particular discrimi-
natory double tax will be colored of course, not only by a consideration of
the adventitious nature of a multiple levy but also by the particular theory
of taxation adopted. A number of theories have been advanced by econo-
mists as a basis for testamentary taxation. Prominent among these are the
Socialistic or diffusion-of-wealth theory which views the state as an instru-
ment to check the aggregation of wealth in a few hands; the cost-of-service
theory which is little recognized as it would justify only probate fees; the
fortuitous income theory which sees this tax as supplementary to the income
tax to reach the real ability of the beneficiary; the back-tax theory which
views the estate as having evaded proper taxation sometime previous to the
assessment of this tax. Moit widely accepted by the courts is the special privi-
lege of transfer theory. Cf. United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 16 Sup. Ct.
1073 (1896). Obviously certain multiple succession taxes will appear to be
reasonable discrimination under one theory and quite arbitrary under
another. Similarly the "double" inheritance taxation of "intangibles" may
appear reasonable under a system of economy in which wealth is represented
for the most part by "tangibles" and quite arbitrary under a modern
economy in which wealth is to a great extent represented by "intangibles."
9 Cf. SELIGMrAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION (1928) c. IV, V; Poc. NAT. TAX.
Ass'N (1925-1929) Reciprocity in I7zheritance Taxation; Bradford, Unz-
certainties and Diversities in Deatk Duty Legislations q)uf Interpretations
(1924) 11 VA. L. REv. 585; Wickersham, Double Taxation (1925) 12 VA. L.
Ra-. 185; Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. REV. 792. Progress in avoiding "double"
taxation has also been made between nations. Cf. SELIGzLN, DOUBLE TAXA-
TION AND INTERNATIONAL FIscAL COOPERATION (1928). The Canadian prov-
inces of Ontario and Yukon have reciprocal agreements with a number of
states in the United States.
10 See Resolution of Chamber of Commerce of United States (May, 1928),
(1928) PRoc. NAT. TAX ASS'N 484, in which it was said: "Inheritance taxa-
tion from an interstate standpoint is in a confused and chaotic condition.
In addition to excessive delays and annoyances there is multiple taxation
which at times approaches confiscation.'
"1"Double" taxation tends to raise artificial economic barriers betw een
states since investors choose securities with special regard to the taxes
imposed. Recently, in a message to the General Assembly of Virginia,
Governor Byrd asked for the repeal of a non-resident transfer inheritance
tax of 2 per cent. on the stock of Virginia Corporations. He said: "This
tax is a direct barrier to the investment of foreign capital in Virginia."
(1928) PRoc. NAT. TAX. ASS'N 483.
- "This is one of the taxes in which the heaviest burden is not the pay-
ment to the Government, but the expense of determining the amount of the
payment." Simonds, Progress in Reciprocity in State Irheritance Taxation
(1925) PR0c. NAT. TAX. Ass'N 246, 251. Cf. Note (1928) 28 COL, L. REV.
806. Many states, in order to determine the amount of the tax, require the
filing of ancillary wills and the retention of counsel. This procedure in
settling the average estate is not only inconvenient and expensive but in
cases of small, diversified foreign holdings may even cost more than it is
worth to the estate. Cf. McNaughton, M2ultiple Succession or Inheritance
Taxes in United States (1927) 164 L. T. 89, where it is suggested that
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advantage to the state assessing it.13 In many states the reac-
tion against it has taken the form of reciprocal legislation 1'
usually providing for the exemption of foreign owned intan-
gibles in states which pass similar statutes or assess no inherit-
ance tax against non-residents. In a few states the taxation
of intangibles owned by non-resident decedents has been en-
tirely abolished. 5 Yet about one fourth of the states, chiefly
mid-western,6 apparently fearing a disproportionate financial
loss or simply because of legislative lethargy, have failed to
pass such measures.",
In finding "double" inheritance taxation of intangibles un-
constitutional, the majority of the Supreme Court in the Mis-
souri case abandoned the traditional conception of "jurisdiction"
as expressed in the dissent of Mr. Justice Stone. In this dissent
it was argued that the necessity of invoking Missouri's laws
to effect delivery of the securities composing the estate gave
that state "jurisdiction." 18 Granting "jurisdiction" the sover-
eign power to tax readily follows. Although this argument
may be legally acceptable, pragmatically it results in the same
smaller estates are hit harder than larger because of the proportionately
larger cost of administration.
13 According to statistics published in (1925) PRoc. NAT. TAX. ASS'N 254,
the income in fourteen states from non-resident estates averaged about
13.1% of the total inheritance tax revenue. According to the experience of
New York only about two-thirds of this amount is derived from intangibles,
Assuming an average revenue of about 9% the apparent monetary loss in
relinquishing this income would not be great. 'The actual loss, of course,
cannot readily be ascertained when factors such as incorporations and in-
vestments enter the computations.
14 It is interesting to note the rapid spread of reciprocal legislation from
four states in 1925 (Pa., N. Y., Conn., Mass.) to more than three-fourths of
the states in 1930.
15 For example, N. J. Laws 1926, c. 294; N. J. Laws 1927, c. 228; N. J.
Laws 1929, c. 144; Mass. Laws 1927, c. 156.
16 Among these are Ky., Minn., N. D., Okla., S. D., Utah.
17 A further difficulty in solving the problem by reciprocal legislation was
encountered in the lack of uniformity in the wording and interpretation of
reciprocal statutes. Thus several states do not apply reciprocity to Florida,
Nevada, or District of Columbia because they have no inheritance tax. For
a discussion of the success of reciprocal legislation in this field see notes in
(1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 806; (1930) 5 Wis. L. Ray. 288.
1 sIn the Minnesota case Mr. Justice Stone concurred in the result on
the ground that the actual transfer of property was completed outside the
state. Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting in the same case, insists: "The right
to tax exists because the party needs the help of Minnesota to acquire
a right, and that state can demand a quid pro quo in return." 280 1U. S. at
218, 50 Sup. Ct. at 102. On "jurisdictional" grounds this reasoning would
seem as strong as that presented by Mr. Justice Stone in the Missouri
decision but in neither case can it be said that these states granted the
succession privilege. That had already been given by the state of decedent's
domicile.
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property being taxed several times over on the same succession.',
In view of the present wide geographical distribution of wealth
in the form of intangibles, and the ease with which the tangible
indicia of such wealth may be separated both from the physical
possession of their owner and from the jurisdiction in which
the property value represented by them is situated, it is al-
most inevitable that more than one state will have sufficient
"'control" over the "intangibles" of an estate to warrant a claim
of "jurisdiction" for taxing purposes.
Perhaps an even more formidable obstacle facing the Su-
preme Court in these decisions was voiced by Mr. Justice
Holmes. While conceding that the taxation policy of the deci-
sions might not be objectionable,"0 he suggested that the proper
solution for "double" taxation is reciprocal state legislation and
vigorously attacked the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to
reach this result. He said in part:
"As the decisions now stand I see hardly any limit but the
sky to the invalidating of those [state] rights if they happen
to strike a majority of this court as for any reason undesirable.
I cannot believe that the Amendment was intended to give us
carte blanche to embody our economic or moral beliefs in its
prohibitions." 21
This argument is neither new, -22 nor lacking in validity, and the
incidental loss of power by the states is perhaps subordinate
to the seriousness of substituting the economic beliefs of the
Supreme Court for the individual economic needs of the various
states, as each state sees this need. The instant decisions, how-
ever, find considerable justification through being in accord with
19 See Faimers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 3, at 209, 50
Sup. C. at 99.
20 In his dissenting opinion in Baldwin v. Missouri, supra note 4, at 439,
Mr. Justice Holmes said: "Very probably it might be good policy to
restrict taxation to a single place, and perhaps the technical conception of
domicil may be the best determinate."
2. Baldwin v. Missouri, supra note 4, at 439. Mr. Justice Brandeis
concurred in the dissents voiced by Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice
Stone.
22 The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the double taxation of real estate and tangibles. Cf. Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905) (Mr. Justice
Holmes dissenting); Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 7. The use of the
Fourteenth Amendment in dealing with these problems has received the
approbation of commentators. Cf. Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court
to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Lazws (1926) 39 HuRV.
L. REv. 533; Nossaman, The Fourteenth Amendment in its Relation to State
Taxaation (1930) 18 CALTF. L. Rnv. 345; Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. llsv. 792.
But ef. notes (1927) 36 YAmE L. J. 694, and (1930) 30 Con. L. REv. 404, in




the majority, and what seems the better, opinion of the states
themselves.
Accepting the proposition that "double" inheritance taxation
of intangibles is contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment, the
question whether the term "intangibles" as used by the United
States Supreme Court includes shares of stock looms as a prob-
lem of major importance. It has usually been held that shares
of stock may be taxed by the decedent's domiciliary as part of
the intangible estate transferred 23 and again by the state which
created the corporation,2 4 authorized the issuance of the shares,
and controls their transfer.25 Under the Minnesota and Mis-
souri decisions, however, corporate debentures are apparently
to be classed as intangibles. Furthermore, in modern corporate
financing distinctions based on the different relationship of
a bondholder and a stockholder to the corporation are slowly
disintegrating. 26 Bondholders are frequently accorded all the
powers and privileges in management previously associated
with common or preferred stock ownership.27 And conversely
the management privileges accompanying many recent so-called
"stock" issues, amount to practically nothing.28 Moreover, it is
23 Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410 (1928) (shares of
a foreign corporation assessed on devolution even though the certificates
were never within the taxing jurisdiction). Cf. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws
(1927) 111.
24 G.f. Hawley v. Madden, 231 U. S. 1, 34 Sup. Ct. 201 (1914); GOODRICH,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 111. See also Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 7.
This case limits the tax assessed by decedent's domicile on foreign issued
shares, to their value after the tax paid to the state of incorporation has
been deducted.
25 It is settled that qualifying to do business in a foreign state or owning
property there does not give that state jurisdiction to tax the succession
of shares issued by the qualifying corporation when owned by a non-resident,
Rhode Island Trust Co. v. Doughton, 270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup. Ct. 256 (1926).
20 Such a distinction has been consistently observed in New York and other
states. Matter of Bronson, 150 N. Y. 1, 44 N. E. 707 (1896). See cases
collected in (1930) 64 U. S. L. R.v. 158. But see Dale, Inheritance Tax
Questions Need Supreme Court Ruling, New York Times, Feb. 9, 1930, at
§ 5, taking the view that stocks and bonds should be included in the same
category for inheritance tax purposes. Cf. Attorney-General Ward of
New York, Reciprocity in Tax Laws, New York Times, Feb. 2, 1930, at § 3,
expressing the opinion that the Minnesota decision probably includes stock
within its scope.
27 "In legal theory the bondholder lends money to an enterprise in which
he is not a participant. . . . At one time in the history of business such
may have been the true situation of the bondholder, but it is not today. He
is distinctly an investor." Isaacs, Business Security and Legal Seourty
(1923) 37 HARv. L. Ray. 201, 210. See to the same effect SELIGMAN, ESSAYS
n- TAXATION (1928) 106. Cf. DEL. GEN. CORP. LAws (1929) § 29; DEwING,
FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) 104.
28 To make a distinction on the functions performed would be impractical
since the bondholder of today may be the manager of tomorrow.
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to be noted that stock is included within the definition of intan-
gibles set out in various reciprocal inheritance tax statutes.2-
Nor do those states which have abolished inheritance taxes on
the intangibles of non-resident decedents make any provision
for retaining such a levy on shares of stock-c It is thought
that the foregoing considerations, together with the more gen-
eral objections already advanced against "double" inheritance
taxation, will lead the Supreme Court to include shares of stock
within its category of "intangibles" subject to inheritance tax
by only a single state.
The dletermination of the situs for this single taxation of in-
tangibles in general and for stock in particular is a more diffi-
cult matter. The present system of assessing inheritance taxes
does not provide for a proportionate distribution of the proceeds
according to some scale of benefits contributed by the different
possible taxing jurisdictions. Consequently if a single tax only
is to be assessed, concession must be made by one or more of
the interested states.
The state of the decedent's domicile has been selected as the
situs for the inheritance taxation of certain intangibles by the
United States Supreme Court 31 and by a number of the states
which have adopted certain reciprocal legislation. This selec-
tion seems appropriate since this tax is based on the privilege
of succession and, as the will is ordinarily probated in the state
of the decedent's residence, this state appears logically to be
the grantor of that privilege. Various considerations of ex-
pediency likewise recommend this choice of situs. A large part
of the intangibles of the average estate are physically located
there.3 2 It appears to be the most convenient place to collect
a single tax on the succession of foreign issued securities of the
estate, thereby avoiding costly and inconvenient ancillary ad-
ministration, the hiring of local counsel, and the obtaining of
transfer waivers in as many states as have "jurisdiction." 3
And since these considerations apply to the succession of stock
as well as to other intangibles, it is difficult to justify a dif-
ferent rule for stock which would require it to be taxed by
the state of incorporation, especially if such rule is based on
29 See New York statute, supra note 1.
30 See the Massachusetts and New Jersey statutes, supra note 15.
31 Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, supra nste 3, at 212, 50 Sup.
Ct. at 100.
32 The difficulty of collecting the tax at the decedent's domicile when in-
sufficient property is present in that state does not appear as a problem of
the average estate; nor is it more bothersome than the enforcement of any
judgment in a foreign jurisdiction.
3 See supra note 12. Cf. Clearwater, Multiple Taxation (1925) 11 VA. L.
REG. (N. s.) 259, 260, where a client of the author's paid $100,000 tax to




that state's claim of having authorized its issue.3 4 Any "serv-
ice charge" for such authorization appears satisfied by the
charge for incorporation, the annual franchise tax and the
stamp transfer tax. The privilege of ordinary transfer has
already been granted by the corporate charter and the judicial
machinery of the incorporating state is not required to effect
a transfer since this can be enforced in any state having juris-
diction over the corporation. Moreover, as already indicated,
the privilege of collecting an inheritance tax on domestically
issued shares from foreign decedents has been willingly given
up by several states"5 which have thereby attracted large num-
bers of incorporations."
It has been suggested that the choice of situs made in the
Minnesota case will work a sectional injustice to the so-called
debtor state in that securities issued in Minnesota and owned
by Eastern decedents will not be taxable in the state which
gave the capital its increase. 37 But only rarely may it be said
that capital is invested "within" a state when employed in
financing modern large corporate enterprise. State borders are
no longer industrial borders, and even where such is the case
the net profit derived from subjecting non-resident decedents
34 But see (1930) 64 U. S. L. Rxv. 161, where it is reported that the Min-
nesota and Oklahoma tax officials believe the Minnesota case does not pre-
vent the taxation of domestic corporate shares owned by non-resident de.
cedents. For a decision taking this view, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Ohio,
8 Ohio Abs. 487 (1930). But see Equitable Trust Co. v. Kentucky State
Tax Comm., U. S. Daily, Sept. 29, 1930, at 2325, expressly denying Ken-
tucky the power to assess an inheritance tax on stock issued by a Kentucky
corporation when owned by a non-resident decedent.
The inheritance tax problem should not be confused with the situation
presented in Corry v. Baltimore, 196 U. S. 466, 25 Sup. Ct. 297 (1904), which
grants to the state creating the stock the power to declare itself the taxable
situs of the shares for purposes of ad valorem taxation. The effect, if any,
which the Supreme Court's recent ruling on "double" inheritance taxation
will have on this situation is not herein treated. Cf. infra note 36.
For example, Delaware and New Jersey.
36 The situation involving "business situs" of credits seems susceptible
of the same solution. This question was not squarely before the court in
the Missouri case although the Supreme Court of Missouri said the credits
therein involved "may have established a business situs in this state in
which case it would be subject to a general tax as well as an inheritance
tax." Just why a "business situs" necessarily results in a situs for in-
heritance taxation is not clear unless resort be had to the "jurisdiction"
theory. Despite the apparent fairness of assessing a business tax on foreign
credits competing with local credits, it is believed those factors which favor
the decedent's domicile as the sole situs for testamentary taxation in the
"debtor" or "physical presence" situation are present here also. Taxation
problems should not be decided on the basis of catch-phrases such as "situs,"
"jurisdiction," and "'mobili sequuntur personam." See generally Powell,
Business SitUs of Credits (1922) 28 W. VA. L. Q. 89.
37 Note (1930) 43 HARV. L. Rav. 792, 795.
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to inheritance taxation appears doubtful. The average gross
income is comparatively small 38 and' is offset to some extent
by a reciprocal tax on the state's own citizens.20 Against this
gross profit, there must also be charged the indirect loss aris-
ing from the discouragement of incorporation and the invest-
ment 40 of capital. Furthermore if the Supreme Court adopts
the same rule for stock as for other intangibles by declaring
stock taxable at the decedent's domicile only, the mid-western
states will of necessity benefit from the fact that a compara-
tively large number of corporations, whose shares are nationally
owned, are organized in the East. Moreover, since Blackstone
v. Miller- is overruled, western owned bank accounts, kept in
eastern banks in order to be near money markets, may no longer
be taxed for the succession privilege by eastern states. 2
As a final argument for a single inheritance taxation situs
for all intangibles, it is suggested that since most states have
graduated inheritance tax scales, by taxing the estate in one
state only instead of dividing it among several the entire estate
will be taxed at its full value, thereby increasing the total rev-
enue from domestic decedents in all the states.23 At the same
time the beneficiaries in the ordinary sized estate will lose
little since the cost of the actual machinery necessary to ef-
fectuate the transfer will be greatly reduced.
38 See supra note 13.
39 Cf. Bradford, op. cit. supra note 9, at 599.
40 See Supra note 11. Delaware, a favorite state for incorporating, has a
constitutional provision, not confined to inheritance, against taxing shares
owned by non-residents. Art. IX, § 6.
41 Supra note 2.
42 This reasoning would not apply if bank accounts or other intangibles
are declared to have a "business situs" in the eastern state and the Supreme
Court rejects the domicillary rule for intangibles with a "business situs.'
Cf. supra note 36.43 This possibility is exemplified by the situation in Frick v. Pennsylvania,
supra note 24, in which corporate shares could be assessed at their full
value without deduction of the tax paid to the state of incorporation, and
by those statutes, designed to take up the 80% allowed the state
under the present Federal Estate Act, which permit the deduction of taxes
paid to the foreign states. A state with this type of statute would directly




THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO EXCLUDE ARTICLES
WHEN THE IMPORTER HAS PRACTICED UNFAIR
COMPETITION*'
THE controversies over tariff policy take a new turn in Fri cher
& Co. v. Bakelite Corp., recently before the Court of Customs
Appeals. The Bakelite Corporation, a domestic manufacturer
of articles made from synthetic phenolic resin, filed a complaint
with the Tariff Commission asking relief under Section 316 of
the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922, which empowered the
President to exclude articles imported under unfair conditions.2
* Since going to press a writ of certiorari in the case discussed in this
comment has been denied by the United States Supreme Court on grounds
which bear out the conclusions reached herein. N. Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1930.
39 F. (2d) 247 (C. C. A. 2d, 1930).
"(a) That unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the im-
portation of articles into the United States, or in their sale by the owner,
importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect or tendency of which is
to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically
operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such
industry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United
States, are hereby declared unlawful, and when found by the President to
,exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other provisions of law, as
haereinafter provided.
(b) That to assist the President in making any decisions under this sec-
tion the United States Tariff Commission is hereby authorized to investi-
gate any alleged violation hereof on complaint under oath or upon its
initiative.
(e) That the commission shall make such investigation under and in
accordance with such rules as it may promulgate and give such notice and
afford such hearing, and when deemed proper by the commission such re-
hearing with opportunity to offer evidence, oral or written, as it may deem
sufficient for a full presentation of the facts involved in such investigation
. . . [findings shall be reduced to writing, as the official record, and sent
to importer or the consignee] . . . that such findings if supported by evi-
dence shall be conclusive, except ... rehearing may be granted by the com-
mission . . . and except that within such time after said findings are made
and in such manner as appeals may be taken from decisions of the United
States Board of General Appraisers, an appeal may be taken . . . upon
a question or questions of law only to the United States Court of Customs
Appeals by importer or consignee of such articles . . . that the judgment
of said court shall be final, except that the same shall be subject to review
by the United States Supreme Court upon certiorari applied for within
three months after such judgment of the United States Court of Customs
Appeals.
(d) That the final findings of the commission shall be transmitted with
the record to the President.
(e) That whenever the existence of any such unfair method or act shall
be established to the satisfaction of the President . . . [he may levy ad-
ditional offset duties within a maxima and minima] . . . or in what ho
shall be satisfied and find are extreme cases . . . he shall direct that such
articles as he shall deem the interests of the United States shall require,
imported by any person violating the provisions of this act, shall be ex-
cluded . . . and upon inforination of such action by the President, the
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The alleged unfair methods consisted of patent infringements
and trademark violations on the part of Frischer & Company,
a domestic importer of synthetic phenolic resin products. The
Tariff Commission found unfair competition to exist and on its
recommendation the President ordered the exclusion of the
competitive articles.3 The Court of Customs Appeals upheld
the pertinent provisions of the Act and the Commission's find-
ings as to trademark violations, but denied the Commission's
jurisdiction over patent infringement.
In sustaining the section of the Tariff Act under review the
Court of Customs Appeals held that the principles of Hampton
Jr. & Co. v. United States,5 controlled their decision.6 The per-
suasiveness of the precedent may be doubted, although the ear-
lier case upheld Section 315, a companion "flexible section" of
the same Act. This Section authorized the President to revise
existing duties only upon finding differences in cost of produc-
tion between foreign and domestic industries1 and made par-
ticipation of the Tariff Commission mandatory.8 Section 316,
however, empowered the President to pass upon the propriety
of importation practices,9 "authorizedbut did not make ex-pressly
Secretary of the Treasury shall through the proper officers . . . refuse
such entry, and that the decision of the President shall be conclusive.
(f) . . . -whenever the President has reason to believe that any article is
offered ... in violation of this section but has not information sufficient to
satisfy him thereof, the Secretary of the Treasury shall, upon his request in
-writing, forbid entry thereof until such investigation as the President may
deem necessary shall be completed.... The Secretary of the Treasury may
permit entry under bond upon such conditions . . . as he may deem
adequate.
(g) . . . any refusal of entry under this section shall continue in effect
until the President shall find and instruct the Secretary of the Treasury
that the conditions which led to the assessment of such . . . refusal of
entry no longer exist." 42 STAT. 858, 943 (1922), 19 U. S. C. A. § 174
(1926).
3 The Secretary of the Treasury issued the order on April 26, 1926.
TREAs. Doc. 41512, 49 Treas. Dec. 715.
4The patent question prompted the dissenting opinion in the Court of
Customs Appeals, as well as the delegation of legislative powers and other
general objections to the section's validity. The majority of the court,
however, placed their ruling squarely upon the trademark violations. Con-
sequently the patent question, interesting as it is, has been purposely
omitted.
5276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct. 348 (1928).
6.. .and, no different principle applies than that 'which was held to be
applicable in the Hampton case." 39 F. (2d) at 253.
7Act of Sept. 21, 1922, § 315 (a), 42 STAT. 858, 942, 19 U. S. C. A. §§
154-159.
s Par (c), supra note 7.
9 Par. (a), supra note 2.
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mandatory participation by the Tariff Commission,'0 entitled
the President to act upon "such investigation as [he] may deem
necessary," n and provided for court review only after action
by the Commission.12 Moreover, the President's decision was
expressly made "conclusive." 's These differences seem to com-
pel a distinct ruling on the validity of Section 316.
If certiorai is granted the Supreme Court will be confronted
with various considerations that militate against validity. First,
one of the settled maxims of constitutional law forbids a delega-
tion of legislative powers.14  Second, the provision making the
President's determination conclusive may be attacked as an out-
right attempt to secure administrative finality.1 Third, the
Section is open to the criticism of statutory uncertainty.', None
of these objections, however, need be controlling.
The argument as to the delegation of powers is well refuted
by an examination of tariff history, which will reveal that the
President's authority over tariff and importation has been given
a gradually widening scope. As early as 1795 Congress em-
powered the President to "lay and regulate" an embargo,
"whenever in his opinion the public safety shall so require;" "
in 1798, the President was entrusted with suspension of a non-
intercourse act when France should refrain from depredations
on United States vessels. The first Act provided that the
President should not exercise the authority while Congress was
in session; the second conferred the power only until "the next
session" of the legislature. That Congress so carefully reserved
10 Par. (b), supra note 2.
n Par. (f), supra note 2.
1 Par. (c), supra, note 2.
1 Par. (e), supra note 2.
14 1 Co=, CONSTrTUTIONAL LImrrATIONS (8th ed. 1927) 224.
15 Such attempts at administrative finality have normally failed. An
instance of this is the Torrens land system which called, at first, for final
determination of land titles by administrative officials. People v. Chase,
165 Ill. 527, 46 N. E. 454 (1896) (held invalid as conferring judicial power
upon county recorder of deeds) ; People v. Simon, 176 IM. 165, 52 N. E. 010
(1898). Cf. Knox v. Kearney, 37 Nev. 393, 142 Pac. 526 (1914) (Nevada
statute giving administrative officers power finally to determine water
rights declared invalid); Niblock, Pivotal Points in the Torrens System
(1915) 24 Y-AL L. J. 274. For general objections to administrative finality,
see Wiel, Administrative Finality (1925) 38 HA.Rv. L. Rv. 447; Pound,
Executive Justice (1907) 55 AM. LAW REG. 137.
16 For a comprehensive, general treatment, see, Freund, Tho Use of
Indefinite Terms in Statutes (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 437; more specific objec-
tions to statutory indefiniteness and uncertainty are listed in Note (1925)
38 HARv. L. REv. 963.
17 Act of June 4, 1795, c. 41, §§ 1, 2, 1 STAT. 372.
is Act of June 13, 1798, c. 53, § 5, 1 STAT. 566.
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these functions to itself at all times when it was in a position to
exercise them, seems to indicate that it then considered them
essentially legislative. But such reservation was not present
in the Act of Feb. 9, 1799,10 which suspended commercial inter-
course between France and the United States, and empowered
the President to "remit the restraints and then revoke his own
order ...whenever, in his opinion the interests of the U. S.
shall require."
In 1813, The Brig Anrora v. Uvitcd States20 upheld the
President's power to revive the operation of a non-intercourse
act by a proclamation that the contingency named in the act
had occurred.21 Four subsequent acts2 2 authorized the Presi-
dent to repeal established duties on foreign goods when "he
shall be satisfied" that "foreign discriminating duties [in] so
far as they operated to the disadvantage of the United States"
had been abolished. 1892 saw the Supreme Court in Field v.
Clark-23 sustaining the "reciprocal provisions" of the McKinley
tariff after the first thorough review of the constitutional ques-
tions involved. These "reciprocal provisions" empowered the
President to prohibit "for such time as he shall deem just,"
the free entry of sugars and other goods, when foreign duties
seemed "reciprocally unjust and unreasonable." -1 The holding
unfortunately was placed on the ground that while legislative
powers could not be delegated, the powers conferred by the
"reciprocal provisions" were not legislative.23 The Revenue
Act of 1916,26 however, provided for an unprecedented invest-
ment of authority, actually if not concededly legislative in scope.
1' C. 2, §§ 4, 5, 1 STAT. 615.
2 1 7 Cranch 382 (1813). Johnson, J., speaking for the court in a short
opinion, did not discuss the constitutional questions involved but confined his
remarks on the instant point to a paragraph.
21 Act of May 1, 1810, c. 39, § 4, 2 STAT. 605-606. The contingency named
in the act was the revocation by France or England of their edicts in viola-
tion of neutral conunerce.
22 Act of March 3, 1815, c. 77, 3 STAT. 224; Act of January 7, 1824, e. 4,
§ 4, 4 STAT. 3; Act of May 24, 1928, c. 111, § 1, 4 STAT. 308; Act of MIay 31,
1830, c. 219, § 2, 4 STAT. 425.
23 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495 (1892).
24 Act of October 1, 1890, c. 1224, § 3, 26 STAT. 567, 612.
2 The holding was unfortunate in the sense that a ruling that no legisla-
tive power may be delegated was not necessary to the case. Nevertheless,
this case is often cited "as to what constitutes and what does not constitute
a delegation of legislative powers." Hampton Jr. v. United States, 14
Cust. App. Rep. 350, 357 (1927). It has been questioned, however, whether
a "legislative" could be distinguished clearly from a "non-legislative" power.
Fairlie, Administrative Legislation (1920) 18 Micn. L. REV. 180. It is re-
grettable, therefore, that one of the influences of a "leading case" should
be due to the judicial technique of creating a barrier which the court
immediately proceeded to circumvent by more or less dialectical methods.
26 §§ 805-806, 39 STAT. 799.
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The President was empowered to prohibit the importation of
foreign articles when the same or other domestic articles were
refused entry iito foreign countries, and to "change, modify,
revoke or renew such proclamation in his discretion."
Whether or not this increasing authorization of executive ac-
tion be considered a delegation of legislative duties, its validity
has been consistently upheld in the interest of administrative
efficiency.27
Nor does the Constitution of the United States expressly for-
bid a delegation of legislative powers. 28  It is merely a maxim
of constitutional interpretation, and one which has been con-
siderably weakened by permitted delegations when the powers
are not "purely" or "strictly" legislative.2 Clearly legislative
powers have often been delegated and the delegation sustained
on the ground that the powers were only "provisionally" ef-
fective3 o or that a "primary standard" had been established by
the legislature.31 Whatever rationalization it may resort to,
2 The subject has been exhaustively treated in its legal phases. Cheadlo,
The DelegatioA of Legislative Functions (1918) 27 YALE L. J. 892; Green,
The Separation of Governmental Powers (1920) 29 YAML L. J. 369; Pills-
bury, Administrative Tribunals (1923) 36 HARV. L. REV. 405, 583; Note
(1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 220; Note (1925) 25 CoL. L. Rp. 359.
28 The implied prohibition is supposedly contained in Art. I, § 1, vesting
"all legislative powers herein granted" in Congress. That there is no
express prohibition, see Foster, Delegdtion of Legislative Power to Ad-
ministrative Officers (1913) 7 ILL. L. REv. 397.
20 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Goodrich Transit Co., 224 UY. S.
194, 32 Sup. Ct. 436 (1911) (employing the term "purely" legislative);
Dowling v. Lancashire Ins. Co., 92 Wis. 63, 65 N. W. 738 (1896) ("strictly"
and "essentially" legislative); State v. Normand, '76 N. H. 541, 85 Atl.
899 ("strictly" legislative). These refinements of phrasing may have been
induced by one or both of two considerations. The courts may have realized
the necessity of permitting delegation of powers if the administration of
law is not to be paralyzed, while assuming the necessity of maintaining a
prohibition against general delegations. Or the courts may have
reasoned that since Congress was vested with only legislative powers, any
delegation must be of legislative authority. But some delegations of powers
had always beell permitted, therefore there must be degrees and varieties
within the delegations themselves. Cf. McGuire, Federal Administrativo
Law (1926) 13 VA. L. REV. 461.
30 In upholding the Federal Trade Commission Act the Courts pointed
out that, in view of the necessity of court enforcement, judicial reviev
was provided and the delegation of powers was not invalid. Sears Roebuck
& Co. v. Federal iTrade Commission, 258 Fed. 307 (C. C. A. 7th, 1919);
National Harness Mfgrs. Ass'n v. Federal Trade Commission, 269 Fed. 705
(C. C. A. 6th, 1920). It is implicit in these decisions that the delegation
of legislative powers is not void from the beginning, but may be valid under
certain conditions.
33 Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 141 Pac. 1083
(1914). While the requirement of "a primary standard" probably arose
from the strict construction of criminal statutes, its application is not
limited to criminal proceedings. Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REV. 963.
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the Supreme Court, in the light of history, can scarcely in-
validate Section 316 of the 1922 Act as an unwarranted dele-
gation.32
The second objection, that of administrative finality, is di-
rected against the provision which makes the President's deci-
sion "conclusive." It has been argued that, even should the
Court of Customs Appeals and the Supreme Court assume
jurisdiction, the President under the provision could disregard
their decisions.3 3 Yet the indefinite phrasing of the Section
does not compell this interpretation. Appeal is provided from
the Tariff Commission, "whose findings, if supported by evidence
shall be conclusive," to the court of Customs Appeals whose
decision is also to be "final, except that the same shall be sub-
ject to review by the Supreme Court upon certiorari . . ." "
The language is unfortunate but the probable intention of the
legislature may be discerned. The courts are empowered to take
appeals only on questions of law.35 The Tariff Commission be-
ing a fact-finding body can determine only factsW3 As the
President may be assisted by the Tariff Commission, their re-
spective functions would appear to be identical and the Presi-
dent's determination likewise limited to fact finding. Should
issues of both law and fact be presented, however, the problem
raised by the failure of the Act to distinguish between the two
assumes a dual aspect. If the President utilizes the Tariff Com-
32 Moreover, the prohibition against delegating legislative powers is prob-
ably effective only as a caution, Powell, Condtitutioaul Isuees iun 1921-1922
(1923) 21 MIicH. L. Rnv. 542, 565, or to prevent the "whole power" of one
department from being transferred to another. Pound, The Judicial Power
(1922) 35 HARV. L. Rnv. 787, 789.
33 "Either appeal to the courts is useless or it should in some way control
the decision of the executive." Parkinson, The New Tariff azd the Delega-
tion of Legislative Power (1923) 9 A. B. A. J. 177, 178. "Our decision has
not the force and effect of law; a conclusion e.xpressed in terms of affirma-
tion or reversal, using the nomenclature customary in court procedure,
means nothing, so far as binding individuals in any legal sense is concerned,
and, apparently, if the Supreme Court shall take the jurisdiction provided
for it by the Statute in this or some similar case, and pronounce a judgment
upon the merits as this court is doing, it will have no greater binding effect
as a judgment at law than our own. By its own force such judgment can
exercise no control over the actions of the executive under the section."
Garrett, J., dissenting in Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., mipra, note 1.
34Par. (c), supra note 7.
35 Par. (c), supra note 2. While the Section authorizs the courts to liti-
gate only questions of law, and makes their decision final, it is within the
power of the Court of Customs Appeals, as a "legislative" court, to give an
advisory opinion. Katz, Federal Legislative Courts (1930) 43 L~nv. L.
REv. 894.
36 United States ex rel. Norweigian Nitrogen Prod. Co., v. U. S. Tariff
Commission, 55 App. D. C. 366, 6 F. (2d) 491 (1925), 34 OP. ATr'Y GEN.
77 (1924). The instant Section, moreover, provides for only fact finding.
Par. (c) supra note 2.
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mission for investigation and the Commissions' recommenda-
tions are appealed, may the President disregard the court rul-
ing and make an independent decision? Or, if the President
does not utilize the Tariff Commission "for such investigation
as he may deem necessary" may his decision be contested in
court even though it is expressly made "conclusive"?
A contestant could certainly seek court review on grounds
of constitutionality or jurisdiction,37 and the President would
be bound by adjudication of either point .3  The word "conclu-
sive" was obviously not intended to vest in the President final
determination of the validity of his powers, of the propriety of
their exercise, nor of the limits of his jurisdiction. The Presi-
dent's decision on factual issues, however, would probably not
be disturbed.39 Although the question of "unfair competition"
is susceptible of judicial determination, a complainant can de-
mand court review only to protect a recognized right.4  And
analogy to the cases dealing with deportation of aliens and
with use of the mails41 suggests that the importation of articles
may likewise be considered a privilege rather than a "vested
right," particularly in view of the plenary power of Congress
over tariff and importation.- Thus, the question of unfair
competition in this field might well be committed to the final
37 Cf. Levitt, The Judicial Review of Executive Acts (1925) 23 MiH. L.
Rv. 588; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the
Supreme Court (1921) 35 HARV. L. REv. 127.
38 Because the final determination of constitutional questions is vested in
the Supreme Court. This doctrine originated in Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137. (U. S. 1803), and is now well settled. I WnIouGouY, CoNSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1929) 7.
3D "It is competent for the legislative to make the determination of an
administrative officer conclusive with regard to questions of fact." BUnDIelC,
THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1922) 415. The question of procedure,
namely, that it is a question of law as to whether there is evidence for the
finding of fact or not, is discussed inf'a.
40 It has been held that appeals from the Court of Custom Appeals relate
to matters which are susceptible of judicial determination but which may
be committed to the final decision of executive officers. In re Bakelite Corp.,
279 U. S. 438, 49 Sup. Ct. 411 (1929). If the person is not entitled to court
review, as of right, on the subject matter, the review may still be pre-
dicted upon right to "due process," discussed infra.
41 Ekiu v. U. S., 142 U. S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. 336 (1892) (deportation of
aliens); United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (1905)
(admission and exclusion of aliens); Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194
U. S. 497, 24 Sup. Ct. 789 (1904) (excluding letters from the mail).
- One does not have a "vested right" to import since the Constitution
vested plenary powers over importation in Congress. Buttfield v. Strana-
han, 192 U. S. 470, 24 Sup. Ct. 349 (1903) ; Rogers, The Exclusiveness of tho
Power of Congress over Interstate and Foreign Commerce (1905) 53 U. OF
PA. L. R v. 529. The "privilege" is, consequently, not so zealously safe-
guarded as in the case of recognized rights. Cf. Powell, Separation of
Powers (1912) 27 POL. SC. Q. 215.
[Vol. 40
COMMENTS
determination of executive officers, and the procedural aspects
of the problem would then assume greater importance.
An opportunity to offer evidence before some sort of tribunal
is generally considered an essential of administrative "due proc-
ess." 3 Yet the section under consideration does not ensure
such a hearing should the President make a decision without
employing the Tariff Commission. It is true that when sum-
mary action is required by the nature of the subject matter,
the elimination of administrative hearings has been sustained.4
In such cases, however, the parties usually have recourse to a
court review by proceeding against the administrative officials."
While it is doubtful whether the President could be made a
party to such an action, 0 a complainant would not be remedi-
less under Section 316. A suit would probably be entertained
against the Secretary of the Treasury, as the President's en-
forcing agent under the Section,47 or against the customs officials
who directly prohibited entry."
The anomalous character of Section 316 was patent to Con-
gress when the Smoot-Hawley Tariff of 1930 was drafted, 0
but the provisions against unfair practices in importation re-
main substantially the same in the later Act.5 Consequently,
43United States ex rel. Norweigian Nitrogen Prod. Co. v. Tariff Commis-
sion, supra note 36. Albertsworth, op. cit. supra note 37.
4 Den. ex. Dem M urray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How.
272 (U. S. 1856) ; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499 (1894);
Hutchinson v. Valclosta, 227 U. S. 303, 33 Sup. Ct. 290 (1913). But see,
Taylor, Due Process-Persistent and Harmful Effccts of Murray v. Hobol:ckn
Land Co. (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 353.
45 Albertsworth, op. cit. supra note 37.
6It has commonly been supposed that the President is responsible to the
courts only for impeachment charges since there is no process by which
to enforce a court order against the chief executive. Cf. Mississippi v.
Johnson, 4 Wall 475 (U. S. 1866). But cf. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United
States, supra note 5, especially at 367; "It is next contended by the appellant
that the President cannot be haled into court and sued by a citizen; that his
acts under Section 315 are not reviewable by the courts . . . that the Presi-
dent may under this section practically rewrite a tariff law, in form and
substance without accountability to anyone. If this be so it goes without
saying that the section cannot be sustained. But we cannot agree with
either the premise or the conclusion."
- Cf. Marbury v. Madison, supra note 38.
4 sCf. Buttefield v. Bidwell, Collector of the Port of New York, 192 U. S.
498, 24 Sup. Ct. 356 (1903).
49'71 CONG. REC. pt. 4, 3698, 4229, 4638 (1929); REP. OF THE TAnwF
COMM. TO THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COA., U. S. Daily, April 22, 1929,
at 421.50 Pub. Doe. No. 361, 71st Congress (H. R. 2667) §§ 337 "Unfair practices
in Importation." The most important changes, perhaps, are in providing for
exclusion only of competitive articles and appeal only to the Court of
Customs Appeals. The President can no longer levy additional offset
duties. The exclusion is to be of "articles concerned in such unfair methods
or acts, imported by any person violating the provisions of this act. . .1
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the same legal considerations militate against the validity of
the more recent tariff section. Yet it is the nature of the prob-
lem itself which renders difficult the drafting of suitable legis-
lation. The only adequate remedy for injury suffered by unfair
methods in importation lies in the immediate exclusion of the
competitive article.5' Should the article be admitted and the
injured party forced to proceed against numerous independent
dealers, the damage-assuming it to exist at all-would be
irreparable. The small recovery in individual cases, coupled
with the expense and delay of prolonged litigation, reveals the
inadequacy of ordinary remedies. Nor would prohibition of
the article prove effective unless enough administrative flexi-
bility exists to ensure prompt exclusion before sufficient impor-
tation should occur to nullify subsequent relief. The difficulty
of providing administrative machinery that is adequate but not
so arbitrary as to be open to abuse has been encountered before.5"
And difficulty of interpretation need not dictate a ruling that a
badly needed law is invalid. Yet one is compelled to agree with
Mr. Justice Van Devanter that the instant section "is long and
not happily drafted." 53
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE SETTING
UP A BASIC MINIMUM OF QUALITY FORLUBRI-
"CATING OILS
A RECENT case I decided by a federal three judge court in the
District for Connecticut holds unconstitutional a statute 2 at-
tempting to establish a basic minimum of quality for lubricating
oils. The statute specified that "oils must be equal to or better
in quality and specifications than that known as United States
Government Specifications for Motor (Class D) Lubricants,"
and set up as the tests by which this quality was to be deter-
mined those contained in Technical Paper No. 323B issued by
the United States Bureau of Mines. The court held specifically
§ 337 (e), supra, and not "such articles as he shall deem the interests of the
U. S. shall require, imported by any person violating the provisions of this
act.... ." § 316 (e), supra note 2. Otherwise the provisions are similar to
the unfair competition provisions of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff of 1922.
51 Cf. REP. OF THE TARIFF CoMM., supra note 49.
52The problem in connection with public utilities has recently been pre-
sented in an article dealing with the New York Public Utility Survey.
Bauer, New York Public Utility Regulation (1930) 20 Am. EcoN, REV. 381.
The problem, however, is common to all fields of administrative law. Cf.
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1929).
53 In re Bakelite Corp., supra note 40.
1 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Trumbull, U. S. Daily, Sept. 8, 1930, at 6 (D. C.
Conn. 1930). The plaintiffs sought an injunction to restrain the state from
enforcing the provisions of the statute.
2 Substitute for House Bill No. 651, c. 296, approved July 2, 1929.
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that the statute was invalid because the test which it proposed
was of no value and was so vague as to be impossible of prac-
tical application. Judge Thomas, however, in delivering the
opinion, went on to say that ". . . the statute cannot be up-
held if it prevents buyers and sellers from dealing in oils just
mentioned [those not meeting the requirements of Technical
Paper No. 323B] in cases where the buyer is getting exactly
what he wants and there is no deception.5 ... Sections of the
act proscribe useful oils which have a wide market and satisfy
the public . . and also any substitutes which are allowed are
determined by an utterly vague test .4 . . .The oils in ques-
tion are useful and harmless substances and as long as sales
are made honestly there can be no reason to prevent purchasers
from obtaining what they wish, even though the article may
be cheaper or inferior to that specified in 323B."
The decision itself was almost inevitable. The plaintiffs, a
group of the largest oil companies in the country," adduced a
vast amount of evidence to prove that the tests contained in
Technical Paper No. 323B were intended primarily for identi-
fication purposes and were of little or no value as an estimate
of the quality of the oils in question.7 It was argued further
that the tests prescribed were chemical tests and as such rela-
3 This position may in part be explained by a survival of the doctrine
of caveat emptor, which still persists in the background of judicial thinking.
In view, however, of the extreme complexity of modern marketing systems,
and the number of commodities on which the consumer relies, he has no
opportunity to judge quality for himself before purchasing, and quality
must of necessity be determined before the product is brought to market.
4 Compare the case of Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497,
45 Sup. Ct. 141 (1925), where a New York statute required all kosher
meat to be plainly labelled and made fraudulent sales of such meat a
misdemeanor. It was objected that the test of kosher meat was derived
from ancient rabbinical tradition and was so vague as to be impossible of
accurate application. The court, however, held the statute valid, saying
that all it required was an honest attempt to meet its standards.
5It may be pointed out that the words "useful" and "harmless" are as
equivocal as the words "better" and "equal" contained in the statute. See
infra, note 11.
e The Atlantic Refining Company, The Beacon Oil Company, Inc., The
Sinclair Refining Co., The Standard Oil Company of New York, The Sun
Oil Company, The Tide Water Oil Sales Corporation, The Texas Company,
The Mexican Petroleum Corporation, and The Vacuum Oil Company.
The reasons for their opposition to the statute were (1) that it would
destroy the good-will which they had built up by extensive and costly
advertising for their various trade-name brands, since the government
guarantee would mean to the public that any oil bearing it was in effect as
good as any other; (2) that it would exclude entirely from sale in Con-
necticut several of their most popular oils; and (3) that it would require
the manufacture of new oils purely for Connecticut trade. Trial Record,
pp. 71, 90, 109, 116-117.
7Trial Record, pp. 26-30, 89, 91-92, 96.
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tively academic," since all the large oil companies, and all the
government departments except the Post Office,0 select their
oils on the basis of purely pragmatic tests made in engines on
dynamometer blocks or in actual service.10 Expert testimony
was advanced to show that oils varied so much in their per-
formance in different machines and under different conditions
of service in the same machine that the statutory requirement
of an oil "equal to or better than" a specified oil was meaning-
less.,, The state called no witnesses to refute these conten-
tions.- Nor did it introduce any evidence either in its briefs
or at the trial to show that abuses existed which required
s Trial Record, pp. 47-49. The statement that chemical tests are purely
academic is hardly convincing. There must be some qualities lacking in
"poor" oil which are present in "good" oil, and which can be discovered,
isolated, and identified by chemical tests.
0 Trial Record, pp. 56-57. Because of its extensive operation of all types
of motor vehicles, however, the needs of this department are most analogous
to those of the ordinary consumer. It may be noted, further, that the oils
used by the Navy Department, do satisfy the requirements of Technical
Paper No. 323B. Trial Record, p. 65.
10 Trial Record, pp. 47-49, 58-59.
11 Trial Record, pp. 94, 98, 101, 115. It is, however, interesting to note
that the plaintiff's witnesses, when asked by counsel for the state whether
under a given set of normal conditions an oil satisfying the specifications
contained in 323B would be better or worse than one which did not, in-
variably avoided the question by reiterating "better under some conditions
and worse under others." Trial Record, pp. 123-137.
12 This case presents the converse of the usual situation in litigation
involving the constitutionality of statutes. The factual and economic brief
first attempted in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273 (187),
and made famous by Mr, Louis D. Brandeis in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S.
412, 28 Sup. Ct. 324 (1908), has practically always been used to support
the validity of the legislation questioned. In spite of the fact that the
courts continually reiterate that the presumption is in favor of constitu.
tionality, it is apparent that in general the burden of proof is on those
who are endeavoring to establish it. Where the statute has been held in-
valid the courts have usually based their decisions largely on legal theories,
such as that involving affectation with the publio interest. Courts up-
holding constitutionality, on the other hand, have in general laid em-
phasis on the existing factual situation and supported their decisions
by varied social and economic as well as legal considerations. In the
instant case the plaintiff oil companies have appreciated the value and
effectiveness of this factual method of approach and have appropriated it
for the purpose of defeating the statute in the face of weak legalistic
arguments by the state. For interesting examples of this contrast in
judicial technique, see Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662
(1917) (employment agency); Block v. Hirsch, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct,
458 (1921) (emergency rent laws); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312,
42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921) (labor injunction); Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394 (1923) (minimum wage law); Jay Burns
Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504, 44 Sup. Ct. 412 (1924) (weight of




correction by such a statute.- Nor did it reply or object to
plaintiff's statement at the trial that the district attorney had
doubted the constitutionality of the statute while it was still
pending in the legislature.- The whole litigation was marked
by a total lack of any real effort to support the constitutionality
of the bill, both in the state's briefs and in its conduct of the trial.
That the decision was practically forced by the one-sided
character of the evidence was unfortunate.'" But the real
danger, implicit in the dictum of Judge Thomas, lies in the
possibility that a decision so prompted be used to defeat
future attempts to establish basic minima of quality. The ob-
jection of Judge Thomas to constitutionality, on the ground of
the exclusion of inferior but harmless products, has been
squarely met by the United States Supreme Court in tvo cases
not cited to the instant court or mentioned in its opinion. An
Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of any illuminating oil
-with a specific gravity of over 46 degrees Baume was upheld,
although it excluded certain provedly safe and useful oils with
a higher Baume rating.6 Iowa and Pennsylvania statutes pro-
hibiting the sale as ice cream of any product which did not
contain a specified percentage of butter fat were also upheld,
although they excluded certain products which were both harm-
less and nutritious.'- The rationale of these cases contains the
two main justifications for the establislunent of basic minima
of quality, the first stressing protection of the public from dan-
gerous or inefficient substances, and the second laying the em-
phasis not so much on the fear of harmful ingredients as on
the fact that the public might rely on qualities in the product
which were lacking in fact.
Nor can it be said that the establishment of such basic minima
is in itself an unwarranted exercise of power by the legislature.'!
is Trial Record, pp. 151-152. When the bill first came before the legis-
latre in 1927 it was defeated by considerations similar to those adduced
at the instant trial. In 1929 it reappeared, backed by the Motor Vehicle
Department, and some evidence was introduced to show that "gyp" oils
were being sold. It is interesting to note that the most influential sup-
porter of the proposed legislation was himself one of the largest independent
oil dealers in the East.
1 Trial Record, p. 152.
15 It has happened before that courts have committed themselves and
important doctrines have become part of the law in cases where the presen-
tation of the ease for one side has been zo inadequate that the court's
decision really has not constituted a fair consideration of the problem
involved. E.g., Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 220,
38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 43 Sup. Ct. 545
(1928).
16 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U. S. 159, 29 Sup. Ct. 270 (1909).
- Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U. S. 153, 37 Sup. Ct. 28 (1916).
Is See the strong dictum in the instant case: "But aside from this, the
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The regulation of the quality of food has become a matter of
course, 19 as has the setting of standards to which physicians
and others must conform.2 0  The states have been supported in
requiring guarantees of bank deposits 21 and in ensuring safe
working conditions.2 2 Even the protection of the state from
inferior citizens by compulsory sterilization of defectives has
been held constitutional. 23 In the field of illuminating oils reg-
ulation has been permitted in that statutes 2 4 providing for
careful inspection have been uniformly upheld.Y It is true that
the primary purpose of this sort of regulation has been to en-
sure safety to the public, rather than quality of performance,
but it often accomplishes both ends. A North Carolina stat-
ute, for example, provides that "illuminating oils sold or offered
for sale in this state shall be subject to inspection and test to
determine their safety and value for illuminating purposes ...
If such analysis or test shows that the oil is either unsafe or of
inferior illuminating quality, its sale shall be forbidden." 20
In many fields in which the legislatures have been unwilling
to make regulations ensuring quality for the consumer, the
courts have done it for them by means of the doctrine of "im-
plied warranty." The instant legislation is hardly more than
a crystallization of this respected doctrine in an attempt to set
up definite tests and standards by which a breach of the "im-
plied warranty" shall be determined. Thus the justification of
the exclusion of certain lubricating oils which have limited and
only warrant for the suppression of a legitimate business in a useful com-
modity lies in the lawful exercise of the police power."
19 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct. 992 (1888) (oleo-
margerine); Price v. Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 35 Sup. Ct. 892 (1915) (boric
acid); United States v. Forty Barrels and Twenty Kegs of Coca-Cola, 241
U. S. 265, 36 Sup. Ct. 573 (1916); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, suprat
note 12 (bread); Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, supra note 4.
20 Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189, 18 Sup. Ct. 573 (1898) (phy-
sician); Crane v. Johnson, 242 U. S. 339, 37 Sup. Ct. 176 (1917) (faith
healer); Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U. S. 425, 47 Sup. Ct. 122 (1926)
(dentist); Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 49 Sup. Ct. 336 (1929)
(optometrist).
21 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186 (1911).
22 Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U. S. 29, 37 Sup. Ct. 371 (1917).
23 Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1927).
24 ALA. CODE (1907) § 7491; N. C. CODE ANN. (1927) §§ 4851, 4860; ID,
ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 48, §§ 1-5; OIaCA9. ComI. STAT. ANN. (1921)
c. 68, art. VI, § 7981. 'The department shall.., cause to be inspected any
gasoline, benzine, or naphtha for the purpose of determining whether the
same is up to the specifications adopted by the United States Department
of the Interior." IowA CODE (1927) c. 159, § 3193.
25 Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, supra note 16; Red C. Oil Mfg. Co.
v. Board of Agriculture, 172 Fed. 695 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1909); Gulf
Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Jinright, 10 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925).
26 N. C. CODE, (1927) art. 14, §§ 4851, 4860.
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technical uses lies in securing a high general quality of lubri-
cants. Furthermore the purposes met by the excluded oils
would be adequately served by the permitted lubricants, though
perhaps at a higher cost to a limited number of consumers.
But the legislature unfortunately defeated its own ends by
attempting itself to define a precise standard as based on specific
tests. Had those selected been more susceptible to flexible in-
terpretation the statute would have been far less open to attack.
It was because of their impracticability that the court was led
to declare the act invalid. And although the specific holding
may be justified from the administrative standpoint, neverthe-
less, in view of the essential function of lubricants in our mod-
ern transportation system, regulation of this sort is clearly a
valid and desirable exercise of the state's "police power."
RESPONSIBILITY OF INSURER FOR DELAY IN ACTING
ON APPLICATION
HALF a century ago the Supreme Court of the United States
voiced the judicial opinion of the time when it declared:
"It was competent for the [insurance] company to pause as
long as they might deem proper and finally to accept or reject
the application as they might choose to do." I
Since then, however, the insecure fortune of an individual pitted
against the security of an actuary table has caused courts to
construct new and distort old legal concepts in an endeavor to
protect that individual. In the recent case of Behnke V. Stand-
ard Accident I-s. Co., a Federal Circuit Court of Appeals did
not hesitate to state:
"It is .. . well settled that an insurance company may be
liable for its delay in passing upon an application for insur-
ance." 2
1 Giddings v. Insurance Co., 102 U. S. 108, 111 (1880). Cf. Misselhorn v.
Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass'n, 30 Fed. 545 (C. C. E. D. Io. 1887);
Steinle v. New York Life Ins. Co., 81 Fed. 489 (C. C. A. 5th, 1897);
Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes, 61 Ala. 163 (1878); Ross v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 124 N. C. 395, 32 S. E. 733 (1899). See also infra
notes 3, 4, and 11.
241 F. (2d) 696, 699 (C. C. A. 7th, 1930). In this case the petitioner
sought to recover compensation insurance, either in contract under the
policy or in tort for negligent delay. The insurance application had been
in the hands of an insurance broker and a bank cashier for a month before
it was forwarded to the defendant company which four days later rejected
it with the statement that "we know absolutely no company who will take
on this risk." Before the cashier had notified petitioner of the rejection
an employee was killed. The court, while recognizing the tort liability of
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Yet in two recent state decisions, Savage v. Prudential Life
Insurance Co.- and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Brady,4
the older and simpler rule appeared to the court an insur-
mountable obstacle to recovery from the insurer. Thus the
Brady case declares in terms reminiscent of the Supreme Court
case:
"This court as presently constituted cannot perceive how a
tort liability can be predicated upon an insurance company until
and unless some legal duty devolved upon the insurance com-
pany to either accept or reject an application for insurance
within a reasonable time. This legal duty must arise by virtue
of some express provision of the statute or from the contractual
relation existing between the parties whereby a legal duty, not
a moral duty, devolves upon the insurance company to act within
a reasonable time upon an application submitted." r
This diversity of result seems to have been caused by the
successive application to similar facts of varying legal theories.
An analytical survey, reducing each of these theories to its
basic concept, may indicate the character of the insurer's duty
as enunciated in the Behnke case and explain why the Indiana
court felt itself constrained to follow the minority view recently
revived by the Mississippi court. It is, therefore, proposed
to consider, in historical order, the contract and tort concepts
of recovery, and to make an attempt to define and evaluate the
duties 6 that may arise thereunder.
The contract of insurance concept. It is axiomatic in the law
of contracts that an offer creates no duty of acceptance in the
offeree.7 Under this concept, therefore, courts have found it
necessary to complete a contract of insurance on which to base
an insurer for negligent delay, held that the defendant company was not
so liable inasmuch as the two intermediaries were not its agents.
3 154 Miss. 89, 121 So. 487 (1929).
4171 N. E. 14 (Ind. App. 1930). Here the deceased applied for a life
insurance policy as a first class risk. Within three weeks a policy which
ranked the applicant as a special risk was sent to the company's agent
who mistakenly kept it for a week. Upon a subsequent tender of the first
premium payment, the agent refused to deliver the policy because the
applicant had been taken ill the previous day. On the applicant's death
her father brought suit. The court held that the insurer was not liable
for negligent delay in acting on an application for life insurance where
the first premium had not been paid. It expressly disapproved of any
imposition on an insurer of a tort duty to exercise due care in acting
promptly upon an application for insurance.
5 Ibid. 17.
0 The terms "right" and "duty" are here used in the H1ohfeldian sense.
See Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning (1913) 23 YATs L. J. 16.
It creates a power of acceptance, but no duty. See Corbin, Offer and




a contractual duty, the violation of which might be actionable.
This has been accomplished both through the doctrine of "con-
structive acceptance," s and that of "silence as acceptance." 1
Neither theory is desirable. No degree of consistency or reg-
ularity has appeared in the courts' use of the constructive ac-
ceptance concept. Nor does any mutual understanding e.,dst
between the parties to warrant the inference of a silent ac-
ceptance. 10  Moreover, when the courts here postulate an
obligation, moral or otherwise, on the part of the insurer to
accept or reject the application within reasonable time, its non-
S Delivery of the policy by the home office to a local agent has been held
an "acceptance." Paine v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 51 Fed. 689 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1905) ; Rose v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 240 Ill. 45, 88 N. E. 204 (1909) ;
Bowman v. Northern Accident Ins. Co., 124 Mo. App. 477, 101 S. W. 691
(1907); Fried v. Royal Ins. Co., 47 Barb. 127 (N. Y. 1860), af'd, 60 N. Y.
243 (1872); Gallagher v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., G7 Misc. 115, 121
N. Y. Supp. 638 (Sup. Ct. 1910); Williams v. Atlas Ass'n Co., 22 Ga. App.
'661, 97 S. E. 91 (1918). Contra: Busher v. New York Life Ins. Co., 72
N. H. 551, 58 Atl. 41 (1909). Execution of the policy in the home office,
Van Arsdale Osborne Brokerage Co. v. Robertson, 36 Okla. 123, 128 Pac.
107 (1912) (action by insurer on premium note given by applicant), and
approval of the application in the home office, Kentucky Mutual Life Ins.
,Co. v. Jenks, 5 Ind. 96 (1854), likewise have been held an "acceptance."
9 Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61 Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1899);
'Great Southern Life Ins. Co. v. Dolan, 239 S. W. 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922),
-rev'd on rehearing, 262 S. W. 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). Cf. Richmond v.
Travelers' Ins. Co., 123 Tenn. 307, 130 S. W. 790 (applicant, having been
led to believe application would be accepted, refrained from obtaining other
insurance); Stearns v. Merchants' Life & Casualty Co., 38 N. D. 528, 165
N. W. 568 (1917). Professor Patterson in a comprehensive article, Tho
Delivery of a Life Imhurance Policy (1919) 33 HARV. L. REv. 198, 216, says:
"'. .. in one class of cases, at least, inaction is communicative, namely, in
-those cases where the offeror delivers something to the offeree when the
offer is made, and the offeree consents to receive the thing, and agrees to
return it if he does not accept the offer. In such cases, the offeree's omis-
'sion to return the thing received is a sufficient communication of his accept-
-ance, because he is under a duty either to return the thing or accept the
offer. The life insurance transaction falls under this head, and it is not
-surprising, then, that a few cases, albeit a distinct minority, have held
-that undue delay in notifying the applicant of the rejeetion of his applica-
'tion will constitute an acceptance of the policy." It is suggested, however,
that agreeing "to return it if he does not accept the offer" does not logically
entail an acceptance of the offer through silence by failure to return "it,"
but rather merely entitles the petitioner to a recovery of the premium under
-the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Cf. Stillwell v. Covenant Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 83 Mo. App. 215 (1900); VANCE, INSURANCE (2d ed. 1930) 189;
Note (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 595.
10 Only rarely is a power to accept by silence alone conferred by an
-offeror. There can only be an acceptance by silence if the applicant-
offeror has either requested such a course of action by express invitation
or suggested it by a custom of past dealing. Cf. Corbin, op. cit. smpra
-mote /, at 200; Comment (1920) 29 YALE L. J. 673.
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fulfilment would seem to be a breach of that obligation to ac-
cept or reject rather than an acceptance through silence."1
The contract of reply concept. It has been suggested 11 that
the law could, if necessary, imply a preliminary contract under
which the filling out of the application would bind the insurer
to a duty of prompt reply. It would seem, however, that the
very factors which might induce a court to adop" this fiction
would be sufficient to raise a simple tort duty in the offeree,
irrespective of any implied contract.
The duty of agent to forward concept. In 1897 the executors
of one Carter brought suit in tort against the Manhattan Life
Insurance Company for undue delay on the part of the com-
pany's agent in forwarding an application for a life policy
which, but for the delay, would have been accepted without
hesitation.' 4 The court held that the agent owed the applicant
a non-contractual duty to forward promptly the request for in-
surance. The possible existence of a "contract of reply" was
also set forth in the opinion but the artificiality of this contract,
which is created solely by implied promises, was emphasized by
the ease with which the tort concept enabled the applicant to
recover without resort to legal fictions. The court recognized
that an applicant for insurance almost invariably deals with the
insurer's agent, but it refused to state whether the insurance
company would have been subjected to a similar duty of prompt
action had the agent forwarded the application at once and the
delay been the fault of the home office.
The duty of insurer to act concept. Some years later, by re-
garding the insurance company as a unit and basing recovery
on its negligent delay rather than on that of its agent alone,
the court in Duffy v. Banker's Ass'n,l on facts similar to those
11 The great weight of authority now opposes the contract of insurance
concept as a basis for recovery. Misselhorn v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n, supra note 1; Alabama Gold Life Ins. Co. v. Mayes, supra note 1;
Stewart v. Helvetia Swiss Fire Ins. Co., 102 Cal. 218, 36 Pac. 410 (1894);
Atkinson v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., 71 Iowa 340, 32 N. W. 371 (1887); Handlier
v. Knights of Columbus, 106 Neb. 267, 183 N. W. 302 (1921) ; More v. Now
York Bowery Fire Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 537, 29 N. E. 757 (1892); Ross v.
New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 1; Dorman v. Connecticut Fire Ins. Co.,
41 Okla. 509, 137 Pac. 262 (1914); Royal Ins. Co. v. Beatty, 119 Pa. 0, 12
Atl. 607 (1888); Northern Neck Mutual Fire Ass'n v. Turlington, 136 Va.
44, 116 S. E. 363 (1923). See also VANCE, Op. cit. supra note 9, at 188;
(1913) 11 MICH. L. REv. 606; (1913) 13 COL. L. REV. 647. For an able
discussion see Funk, The Duty of an Insurer to Act Promptly on Applica-
tions (1927) 75 U. PA. L. REv. 207, 210. For a contrary view see Patterson,
op. cit. supra note 9, and cases cited therein.
12 Comment, supra note 10, at 676.
13 The advantage of employing a tort duty in place of a contract duty as
a basis for recovery is discussed infra.
14 Carter v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 11 Hawaii 69 (1897).
"s 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087 (1913). This decision, although grounded
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of the Carter case, transcended the arbitrary limits of the ear-
lier decision. Thereafter the Duffy case was, until the Savage
case, followed in almost every state in which the question
arose.16 The limitation upon this broader tort duty expressed
in the Behnke case, however, that "before there can be a re-
covery in such cases damages must be proved," I- seems unfor-
tunate. Although a practical view -ill disclose few, if any,
suits for nominal damages, yet an analytical one will stress the
advisability of allowing a judgment for nominal damages, 8 lest
the concept of no duty on the part of the insurer without sub-
stantial damages encourage, as in the Brady case, the doctrine
of no duty at all.
Into the new tort duty, first advanced at the time of the
Duffy case, the courts have carried over many of the conclusions
formerly evolved under the contract concepts. Thus, according
to the older theory, if an applicant was not an acceptable risk
there was no meeting of the minds and hence there could be
no contract. Once a tort duty of prompt reply has been estab-
lished, however, such a distinction seems to have no logical
application. The point becomes especially significant where, as
in Gonsoulin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,', the company
does not refuse to insure but merely demands a higher pre-
mium than has been anticipated. Here the difficulty of deter-
mining damages, arising from the uncertainty as to whether
the applicant would have accepted the more expensive policy,
scarcely warrants a condonation of the insurer's negligent delay.
upon a similar holding in Boyer v. State Farmers' Mlutual Hail Ins. Ass'n,
86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912), has received more attention owing to its
elaborately reasoned opinion. See (1913) 27 HARV. L. Rlv. 92; (1913) 13
COL. L. REv. 647; (1913) 11 IicH. L. REV. 606.
16 De Ford v. New York Life Ins. Co., 75 Colo. 146, 224 Pac. 1049 (1924),
noted in (1924) 34 YAiE L. J. 102; Royal Neighbors v. Fartenberry, 214
Ala. 387, 107 So. 846 (1926); Wallace v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 31 Idaho
481, 174 Pac. 1009 (1918); Wilkins v. Capital Fire Ins. Co., 99 Neb. 828,
157 N. W. 1021 (1916) ; Fox v. Ins. Co., 185 N. C. 121, 116 S. E. 26 (1923) ;
Security Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 85 Okla. 171, 205 Pac. 151 (1922) ; Columbian
National Life Ins. Co. v. Lemmons, 96 Okla. 228, 222 Pac. 255 (1924);
Brown v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 124 Okla. 155, 254 Pac. 7 (1927);
VANcE, op. cit. supra note 9, at 192. Contra: National Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. School District, 122 Ark. 179, 182 S. W. 547 (1916); Interstate Business
'Alen's Accident v. Nichols, 143 Ark 369, 220 S. W. 477 (1920); Savage v.
Prudential Life Ins. Co., supra note 3; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Brady,
supr note 4. Cf. Bradley v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 295 I1. 381, 129 N. E.
171 (1920), noted in (1921) 19 MiCH. L. REv. 737.
17 41 F. (2d) at 700.
1 81 CooIEY, ToRTs (3d ed. 1906) 2; Bumicx, TonTs (4th ed. 192G) 239;
SEDCWiCK, DAMAGES (9th ed. 1912) §§ 96-104. The desirability of holding
the insurer to a norm of conduct, discussed infra, irrespective of pecuniary
damages to the applicant, would seem to exclude this situation from those
torts which are dependent upon appreciable damages before liability ensues.
:19 152 La. 865, 94 So. 424 (1922).
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Yet the holding in the Gonsoulin case is to this effect. On this.
point the attitude of the Brady case is to be preferred. There
the court, in its discussion of ,a tort liability, did not base its,
denial of recovery upon the issuance of a different kind of policy;,
it used that fact merely to show a counter-offer which would
preclude recovery under any contract theory.
A further confusion of contract with tort concepts is exem-,
plified by the cases holding with the Brady case that an applica-
tion unaccompanied by the first premium payment cannot be
the basis of a successful suit even though recovery would be
granted had the premium been paid. This, with a single ex-
ception, 2 is a distinction recognized throughout the country.21
Under the contract concepts of recovery, to be sure, the pay-
ment of the first premium is of some significance since it forms
part of the consideration for the "promise" of the company or
its agent.22 In the tort concepts, however, it can have no bearing
whatever on a duty for prompt action by the insurer as long
as the applicant has performed all the formal requirements of
the applicatibn and payment of the first premium is not among
them.
Enough has been set forth to demonstrate the reluctance of
the courts to abandon completely those contract principles which
were the first to be applied to the instant situation. It is, how-
ever, urged that the tort concept, when it is isolated in the form
of a; duty of the insurer to act, has sufficient strength to jus-
tify its existence independent of all collateral support. It is,
not necessary to revert to the age-old doctrine that one who-
undertakes to do an act must do it with care.2- Nor is it
necessary to introduce the insurance 'company into the field of
public service industries 2 merely because state regulation of
20 Eames v. Home Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 621 (1877).
21- Giddings v. Ins. Co., supra note 1; Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,.
supra note 3; cases cited supra notes 11 and 16.
22 It was also argued that the application unaccompanied by a premium
payment was merely an invitation for an offer, while the presence of the
premium transformed the invitation into an offer. This emphasis placed
upon the payment of the first premium was further justified by the consid-
eration that the insurance company would be unduly favored were it per-
mitted to benefit by the first premium without giving protection during that
period. Cf. Funk, op. cit. supra note 11, at 209.
23 Cf. Condon v. Exton Hall Brokerage and Vessel Agent, 80 Misc. 309,
142 N. Y. Supp. 548 (City Ct. 1913). See (1913) 27 HAnv. L. lEv. 92'
and (1918) 2 MINN. L. REv. 53 on the distinction between misfeasance
and non-feasance.
24 See (1913) 11 MiH. L. Rav. 607. Patterson, op. cit. supra note 9, at
216, suggests that every person who applies to a company for a kind of'
policy issued by the company should be insured from the date of application
if it can be proved that he was, when he applied, an acceptable risk. Com-
ment, supra note 10, disapproves of this view. The latter position seems.
sound since compulsory acceptance of every "acceptable" risk would, in a.
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rates 25 and a statute regulating the acceptance of applications -
have been permitted. Nevertheless, the social desirability and in-
creasing use of insurance 27 in all forms for ameliorating the situ-
ation of unfortunate individuals by the laws of probability is evi-
dent in many fields of pursuit. There is, therefore, a great need
for the courts to recognize the position of guardianship occupied
many fields of pursuit. There is, therefore, a great need for
the courts to recognize the position of guardianship occupied
by the insurer in society and to endow the insurer with a re-
sponsibility for efficient action far greater than is required of
the corner grocer. This need can be met by adding to the ap-
plicant's privilege to apply for insurance a right to be treated
according to the best principles of business, and by considering
any deviation from this reasonable norm a violation of the ap-
plicant's right for which he is entitled to receive the penalty
inflicted upon the insurer for the breach of the correlative duty.
It is suggested that a recognition of this tort duty, stripped of
the hampering vestiges of other concepts, would go far in
terminating the conflict resulting from faulty analysis and legal
fictions, and in halting the undesirable trend recently mani-
fested in the Mississippi and Indiana decisions.
suit for non-acceptance, substitute a jury of laymen in the place of the
insurance company'§ experts in passing on the question of acceptability.
25 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. G12
(1914).
26 National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U. S. 71, 43 Sup. Ct. 32
(1922), noted in (1920) 19 Alicn. L. REV. 340, held constitutional a statute
compelling the insurer to reply to an application for insurance within
twenty hours under penalty of acceptance through silence.
27 Attention is called to the compulsory automobile insurance of Massa-
chusetts, to the Workmen's Compensation Laws, and to other forms of
liability without fault, established in order to turn individual mishaps into
incidents of social intercourse. Cf. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250
U. S. 400, 39 Sup. Ct. 553 (1919).
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